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THE UNENFORCED PROMISE OF EQUAL PAY ACTS:
A NATIONAL PROBLEM AND POSSIBLE SOLUTION
FROM MAINE
Elizabeth J. Wyman, Esq.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Equal pay for women is a concept that has been around for a long time. It was
during World War I that women were first guaranteed pay equity in the form of
regulations enforced by the War Labor Board of 1918. The Board's equal pay
policy required manufacturers, who put women on the payroll while male employ-
ees were serving in the military, to pay those women the same wages that were
paid to the men. 1 The National War Labor Board continued that trend through
World War 11.2 Shortly after the war, states began enacting statutes that required
employers to pay female workers the same wage rates for male workers for work
that was either "equal" or "comparable" to the work of men.3 The distinction
between "equal work" and "comparable work" in these statutes makes a crucial
difference in the standard of proof, as will be discussed below. 4
In 1963, after considerable delay and wrangling, the United States Congress
passed the Equal Pay Act as part of the Fair Labor Standards Act.5 The federal law
prohibits discrimination in the payment of wages based on sex for "equal work on
jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and
which are performed under similar working conditions." 6
Almost forty years later, neither the federal Equal Pay Act nor the state stat-
utes have done much to solve the wage disparity that exists between men and
* Elizabeth J. Wyman, Esq. is an Assistant Attorney General for the State of Maine. She
received a J.D. from the University of Maine School of Law in 1993.
1. 1 WAR LABOR REPORTS, NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD: ITS ESTABLISHMENT AND HISTORICAL
SETTING, at x-xi (1942) (chronicling the history of the board, including the history of the War
Labor Board of 1918, which had as a policy "equal pay for women who replaced men"). See
Janice R. Bellace, Comparable Worth: Proving Sex-Based Wage Discrimination, 69 IowA L.
REV. 655, 659 (1984).
2. In an Introductory Note to the final volume of the War Labor Reports, the editors stated
that "[t]he principle of equal pay for equal work regardless of race, color, creed, or sex was
applied by the Board in a number of cases, and special attention was paid to the social and
economic necessity of correcting substandards of living." 28 WAR LABOR REPotrs, at ii (1946).
General Order No. 16 of the National War Labor Board provided:
Adjustments which equalize the wage or salary rates paid to females with the rates
paid to males for comparable quality and quantity of work on the same or similar
operations and adjustments in accordance with this policy which recognize or are
based on differences in quality or quantity of work performed may be made without
approval of the National War Labor Board.
21 WAR LABOR REPORTS, at lvii (1945).
3. Jancey v. Sch. Comm. of Everett, 658 N.E.2d 162, 167 (Mass. 1995).
4. See infra Part I.C.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1998). Passage of the Equal Pay Act took many years. The first
bill proposing equal pay for women doing "comparable work" as men was introduced in 1945.
County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 185 n.l (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
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women. According to data released after the 2000 census, the average American
woman working full time earns 76% of what the average American man earns. 7
This is an increase from the 63% reported in 1979, the first year of comparable
earnings data. 8 Maine women have fared only slightly better. In 2001, the average
Maine woman working full time earned 79.4% of what a man earned in Maine. 9
Poor enforcement of equal pay laws is not the root cause of the continuing wage
inequity between men and women. Complex social issues relating to women's
roles in the home and workplace contribute to the failure of women to attain pay
equity with men. 10 Nevertheless, better enforcement of laws prohibiting discrimi-
nation in the payment of wages on the basis of sex would help diminish the wage
gap.
Since 1949, Maine has had an equal pay statute that prohibits employers from
discriminating between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages at a rate
less than the rate paid to the opposite sex for "equal work," and since 1965 for
"comparable work."11 As noted above, several states have similar pay-equity laws,
either requiring women to be paid equally for "equal work" or for "comparable
work." 12 Many of these statutes date back to the 1940s and 1950s.13 Michigan's
statute, which makes payment of women at a wage less than "similarly employed"
men a misdemeanor, dates back to 1931.14 In a 1940 case upholding the constitu-
tionality of the statute, the Michigan Supreme Court noted: "[i]t is a matter of
common knowledge that there are great numbers of women employed in manufac-
turing and that many employers pay their women employees less than they pay
their men employees for identical work." 15
7. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN'S EARNINGS IN 2001, at 1 (May
2002).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 15.
10. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the various causes of the gender wage gap
or the barriers women face in the workplace. The "human capital explanation," which asserts
that women earn less than men because of the division of labor within the family resulting in
productivity differences between the sexes, as well as discrimination are the two most frequently
cited reasons for the continued wage gap. LINDA LEVINE, THE GENDER WAGE GAP AND PAY EQ-
UITY: Is COMPARABLE WORTH THE NEXT STEP?, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 4-10 (2001). It has long
been assumed that "occupational sex segregation" accounts for considerable wage disparity.
While studies show that female-dominated jobs generally pay less than male-dominated jobs,
the causes of the wage gaps remain in dispute. See David A. Macpherson & Barry T. Hirsch,
Wages and Gender Composition: Why Do Women's Jobs Pay Less?, J. OF LAB. ECON., July 1995,
426. The so-called "glass ceiling" which refers to "barriers to the advancement of minorities
and women within corporate hierarchies" has also been the subject of intense study. See FED-
ERAL GLASS CEILING COMMISSION, A SOLID INVESTMENT. MAKING FULL USE OF THE NATION'S HUMAN
CAPITAL, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FEDERAL GLASS CEILING COMMISSION 9 (1995).
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part II.C.
13. The Massachusetts statute was enacted in 1945 and is purportedly the earliest equal pay
statute. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105A (Law. Co-op. 2001); see also Jancey v. Sch. Comm.
of Everett, 658 N.E.2d 162, 166 (Mass. 1995). New Hampshire enacted its equal pay act in
1947. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.37 (1999 & Supp. 2002). California's statute dates to 1949,
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1197.5 (West Supp. 2002), as does Connecticut's, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 31-75,
31-76 (1997), and Rhode Island's statutes. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-6-17 to 28-6-21 (2001). Oregon's
statute dates to 1955, ORE. REV. STAT. § 652.220 (1999), and Maryland's statute was enacted in
1957, MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-304 (2001), as was Wyoming's. Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§
27-4-301 to 27-4-304 (Michie 2001).
14. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.556 (1991). See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Read, 293 N.W. 751, 752
(Mich. 1940).
15. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Read, 293 N.W. at 754-55.
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Passage of the federal Equal Pay Act in 1963 provided further remedy for
women workers. The federal statute's requirement that the work be equal in nature
makes proving a case under the federal scheme a more difficult undertaking than
in Maine and in the other states where the "comparable work" standard provides a
less stringent burden of proof.
Even with the lower standard of proof, however, women do not use these state
statutes to bring pay-equity claims. In Maine, for example, in the thirty-seven
years that the comparable work standard has been a part of the statute, there has
not been a single reported case discussing a claim brought pursuant to the statute.
In 2001, Maine's Bureau of Labor Standards adopted a set of rules that could en-
hance enforcement of the equal pay statute. 16 The introduction of an administra-
tive claims process, as well as the use of an employer's self-audit to encourage
voluntary compliance, may lead to greater enforcement of the law. Maine could,
in fact, lead the way for other states to enforce their pay-equity laws.
This Article will compare Maine's equal pay statute to the federal Equal Pay
Act, as well as to other states' pay-equity laws. It will discuss how these statutes
have been interpreted by courts, how they have been enforced, or not enforced,
and explore ways to increase their enforcement. This Article will also discuss the
comparable worth doctrine, which is a broader concept than either the equal-pay-
for-equal work requirement of the federal Equal Pay Act or the state "comparable
work" statutes. This Article will conclude with analysis of Maine's equal pay rules
to enforce its own statute and will discuss ways in which Maine's workers and
employers can be encouraged to use the rules to decrease the wage gap for women
in Maine.
II. EQUAL PAY STATUTES
A. Maine's Equal Pay Law-Past and Present
There is scarce material available on the history of Maine's Equal Pay Statute.
The initial bill was titled "An Act to Provide for Equal Pay for Equal Work" and
was introduced by Senator Haskell of Penobscot County to the 94th Legislature on
January 26, 1949, as a proposed addition to the labor statutes as section 40-A, 17 as
follows:
No employer shall employ any female in any occupation in this state at salary or
wage rates less than the rates paid by that employer to male employees for work
of a like or similar character or for work on like or similar operations. Any
individual, association or corporation who violates the provisions of this section
shall be punished by a fine of not more than $200.
The provisions of this section shall not apply to the state, counties, cities and
towns, or to charitable and educational institutions or to those employees whose
wage rates are determined by written agreement, resulting from collective bar-
gaining. 18
16. Me. Dep't of Labor Reg. 12-170, Ch. 12 (Nov. 19, 2001).
17. Sections 38, 39, and 40 dealt with "Payment of Wages." R.S. ch. 25, §§ 38-40 (1944).
18. L.D. 138 (94th Legis. 1949).
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The legislative document for this bill does not have a statement of fact describing
the purpose for the proposed legislation. 19 The bill was referred to the legislative
Committee on Labor and was sent down for concurrence. 20 The first paragraph of
the bill was amended by the Labor Committee in significant fashion:
No employer shall employ any female in any occupation within this state for
salary or wage rates less than the salary or wage rates for equal work. However,
nothing in this section shall prohibit a variation in salary or wage rates based
upon a difference in seniority, experience, training, skill, ability, or difference in
duties or services performed, either regularly or occasionally, or difference in the
shift or time of the day worked, or difference in availability for other operations,
or other reasonable differentiation except difference in sex. Any individual, as-
sociation or corporation who violates the provisions of this section shall be pun-
ished by a fine of not more than $200.21
The Committee's work on the bill meant that a woman would have to prove that
her work was "equal" to the work of the men employed by the employer, not as
previously introduced in the proposed legislation for work that was "of a like or
similar character" or "work on like or similar operations." In addition, the new
draft of the bill added significant exceptions to the application of the equal pay law
for factors such as seniority or experience, among other things. Again, the legisla-
tive document accompanying this new draft of the bill is without a statement of
fact, nor are there any surviving notes from the Labor Committee of 1949 to ex-
plain these changes to the proposed legislation.22
A final amendment to the bill was made by the Senate, which struck out the
last paragraph of the legislation, such that the equal pay act would apply to state
and local governments. 2 3 Again, however, the dearth of comment on the bill makes
it difficult to speculate as to why the Senate desired removal of this exception from
the final version of the bill. The only testimony regarding the bill pertained to an
error that had been made in redraft of the bill, which amendment A apparently
solved. 24 This testimony suggests that the Labor Committee intended to strike out
this limiting language before it was brought before the Legislature for final action
on the bill.
19. Id. In tracking legislative history in Maine, the statement of fact, often found at the end
of a legislative document, provides helpful information regarding the intent of the proposed
legislation. Franklin Prop. Trust v. Foresite, Inc., 438 A.2d 218, 223 (Me. 1981).
20. L.D. 138 (94th Legis. 1949). See also Legis. Rec. 134 (1949).
21. L.D. 1466 (94th Legis. 1949). The second paragraph of the bill remained the same as it
appeared in L.D. 138.
22. The Maine State Archives are the repository for legislative materials of this historical
period. A box containing Labor Committee notes from the 94th Legislature did not contain any
documents relating to this proposed legislation.
23. Sen. Amend. to L.D. 1466, No. S-256 (94th Legis. 1949).
24. Senator Hopkins presented Senate Amendment A and moved for its adoption, testifying
as follows:
Mr. President and members of the Senate, in explanation I will say that somewhere
between the clerk of the committee, the Revisor of Statutes, the signer of the report
and the chairman of the committee, there was an error made in the redraft of the bill
and the amendment brings the bill to consistency with the action of the committee.
1 Legis. Rec. 1142 (1949). One day later Representative Sharpe similarly testified in the Housethat "[t]his Senate Amendment 'A' is merely to correct an error which was made in the re-draft
of this bill. The Amendment is consistent with the action of our committee and I move its
adoption." Legis. Rec. 1217 (1949). The motion to adopt the Senate Amendment prevailed, and
the amendment was adopted. Id.
The bill was passed by the 94th Legislature on April 22, 1949,25 in the follow-
ing final text:
Sec. 40-A. Wage rates for equal work; penalty; exception. No employer shall
employ any female in any occupation within this state for salary or wage rates
less than the salary or wage rates paid by that employer to male employees for
equal work. However, nothing in this section shall prohibit a variation in salary
or wage rates based upon a difference in seniority, experience, training, skill,
ability, or difference in duties or services performed, either regularly or occa-
sionally, or difference in the shift or time of the day worked, or difference in
availability for other operation, or other reasonable differentiation except differ-
ence in sex. Any individual, association or corporation who violates the provi-
sions of this section shall be punished by a fine of not more than $200.26
This version of the law remained in effect until 1965, when the Legislature intro-
duced a bill that renewed the concept of "comparable work." The bill as it was
first proposed would have amended the first sentence of the statute to read: "[n]o
employer shall employ any female in any occupation within this State for salary or
wage rates less than the salary or wage rates paid by that employer to male em-
ployees for equal or comparable work."'27 There is no statement of fact accompa-
nying this bill to explain why the Legislature wanted to replace the "equal work"
requirement with the broader "comparable work" standard.2 8 The bill was subse-
quently amended to expand what was meant by "comparable work" and to fine
tune the exceptions to the equal pay rule:
No employer shall discriminate between employees in the same establishment on
the basis of sex, by paying wages to any employee in any occupation in this State
at a rate less than the rate at which he pays any employee of the opposite sex for
comparable work on jobs which have comparable requirements relating to skill,
effort and responsibility. Differentials which are paid pursuant to established
seniority systems or merit increase systems, or difference in the shift or time of
the day worked, which do not discriminate on the basis of sex, are not within this
prohibition. No employer may discharge or discriminate against any employee
by reason of any action taken by such employee to invoke or assist in any manner
the enforcement of this section. 29
This version of the bill was enacted, again without comment or debate.30 One
could speculate from the timing of this amendment, as well as the language relat-
ing to "skill, effort, and responsibility," that the Legislature was reacting to pas-
sage of the federal Equal Pay Act two years earlier in 1963, which provided equal
pay for equal work, using very similar language with respect to skill, effort, and
responsibility. 3 1 The adoption of "comparable work" in place of "equal work"
25. 2 Legis. Rec. 1518, 1529 (1949).
26. P.L. 1949, ch. 262, § 40-A (effective Aug. 6, 1949).
27. L.D. 1189 (102d Legis. 1965).
28. See id.
29. L.D. 1412 (102d Legis. 1965).
30. There is no statement of fact attached to L.D. 1412, nor was there any floor debate on the
amendment. The Legislative Record contains references only to the business of introducing and
passing the amendment. 3 Legis. Rec. 316, 425,911,929, 944, 991, 1084, 1103 (1965).
31. The federal Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000), prohibits discrimination in the
payment of wages on the basis of sex for "equal work on jobs the performance of which requires
equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working condi-
tions." Id. § 206(d)(1). See infra Part II.B.
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seems to reflect a legislative intent to go beyond the federal Equal Pay Act's "equal
work" standard.
In 1983, the Maine Legislature amended the equal pay statute as part of a
larger effort to coordinate the way that employers are fined for violation of state
labor laws. The last sentence of section 628, which referred to the fine of $200 on
employers who violated the equal pay law, was deleted. 32 At the same time the
Legislature amended section 626-A, "Penalties," to provide that violation of cer-
tain enumerated labor laws would result in a fine of "not less than $100 nor more
than $500 for each violation."'33 The current version of the Penalties section pro-
vides that an employer who violates any of the provisions of section 628 "is sub-
ject to a forfeiture of not less than $100 nor more than $500 for each violation."'34
In 1996, the Commission To Study Poverty Among Working Parents released
a report that included a recommendation that the Department of Labor promulgate
rules to enhance enforcement of the equal pay law. 35 In response to this study, the
Legislature passed a resolve in 1997, directing the Department to adopt rules in
consultation with the Maine Human Rights Commission to implement the provi-
sions of the equal pay law.36 The Bureau of Labor Standards drafted a first set of
rules in 1999. 37 After public hearing on the proposed rules, however, the Bureau
withdrew the draft, having concluded in response to comments from the public
that the proposed rules would not sufficiently advance enforcement of the equal
pay law. 38 The Bureau engaged a private firm to conduct a survey of other juris-
dictions, seeking information as to effective methods of enforcing equal pay laws.39
With greater information in hand, the Bureau drafted a second set of proposed
rules and issued them for public comment in March 2001. The rules were well
received and were adopted by the agency in July 2001.40
Also in 2001, the Legislature again had the opportunity to reexamine section
628. This time the bill purported to "address the manner in which the existing state
and federal law requiring equal pay for equal work is implemented and enforced." 4 1
The bill proposed two changes to the equal pay statute. First, the Legislature en-
acted an "Equal Pay Day," to be the first Tuesday in April. 42 Second, section 628
32. L.D. 1902, § 3 (lllth Legis. 1984).
33. Id. § 1. The statement of fact section of the L.D. states that the bill "makes the same
penalty applicable to violations of several related sections of state labor law. The Department of
Labor is also authorized to collect fines incurred due to violations of the wage and medium of
payment subchapter of state labor law." Id.
34. 26 M.R.S.A. § 626-A (Supp. 2001).
35. Commission To Study Poverty Among Working Parents, Report to the 117th Legislature
10, 19,41 (Nov. 15, 1996).
36. L.D. 329 (118th Legis. 1997).
37. Me. Dep't of Labor Reg. 9.12-170 (proposed Jan. 5, 1999).
38. Interview with Michael Frett, Director of Bureau of Labor Standards, Maine Dept. of
Labor, and William A. Peabody, Deputy Director, Bureau of Labor Standards, Maine Dept. of
Labor, in Hallowell, Me. (May 23, 2002).
39. CRITICAL INSIGHTS STRATEGIC MARKETING RESEARCH, SUMMARY REPORT TO THE MAINE Bu-
REAU OF LABOR STANDARDS: COMPARABLE WORTH (2000).
40. Me. Dep't of Labor Reg. 12.12-170 (adopted July 31, 1999). See infra Part IV for discus-
sion of the rules. The rules became effective on November 19, 2001. Me. Dep't of Labor Reg.
12.12-170 (Nov. 19, 2001). The full text of the rules is appended to this article.
41. L.D. 489, Concept Draft Summary (120th Legis. 2001).
42. Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 489, No. 5-188 (120th Legis. 2001). Designation of Equal Pay
Day in Maine is now located at 1 M.R.S.A. § 145 (Supp. 2001).
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was amended to add a reporting requirement to occur on Equal Pay Day.4 3 At the
time this bill was pending in the Legislature, the Commissioner of the Department
of Labor wrote a letter to the Joint Standing Committee on Labor pointing out that
the Bureau of Labor Standards had received only one complaint under the law
since 1965 and that the Bureau had drafted rules regarding enforcement of the
equal pay statute.44
The statute in its current version reads, in full:
An employer may not discriminate between employees in the same establish-
ment on the basis of sex by paying wages to any employee in any occupation in
this State at a rate less than the rate at which the employer pays any employee of
the opposite sex for comparable work on jobs that have comparable requirements
relating to skill, effort and responsibility. Differentials that are paid pursuant to
established seniority systems or merit increase systems or difference in the shift
or time of the day worked that do not discriminate on the basis of sex are not
within this prohibition. An employer may not discharge or discriminate against
any employee by reason of any action taken by such employee to invoke or assist
in any manner the enforcement of this section.
The Department of Labor shall annually report to the joint standing committee of
the Legislature having jurisdiction over labor matters on progress made in the
State to comply with this section. The report must be issued annually on Equal
Pay Day as designated pursuant to Title 1, section 140.45
There are no reported Maine cases interpreting the equal pay statute. 46 Ac-
cording to officials at the Bureau of Labor Standards at the Maine Department of
Labor, complaints about equal pay are extremely rare, with only one instance in
recent years in which the Bureau conducted an investigation. 47 The Bureau's pro-
mulgation of rules creating an administrative process for such claims may enhance
enforcement of the statute. Before discussing Maine's rules in particular, it is
useful to compare Maine's statute with the federal Equal Pay Act, as well as to the
equal pay statutes in other states.
B. The Federal Equal Pay Act
The Equal Pay Act (EPA) was passed in 1963, becoming a part of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.4 8 It provides, in pertinent part:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall
discriminate within any establishment in which such employees are employed,
between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such
43. Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 489, No. 5-188 (120th Legis. 2001).
44. Letter from Valerie R. Landry, Commissioner of Maine Department of Labor, to Hon.
Betheda G. Edmonds, Senate Chair et al. (April 3, 2001) (contained in Committee File for L.D.
489 (120th Legis. 2001)).
45. 20 M.R.S.A. § 628 (Supp. 2001).
46. There was an Attorney General's opinion issued shortly after the equal pay law was
enacted in 1949, in which the Attorney General advised that teachers were not covered by the
statute. Op. Me. Att'y Gen. (1950), reprinted in 1949-1950 Me. Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 175.
There is a Massachusetts case that cites the Maine statute for the purpose of showing that it is
similar to the Massachusetts equal pay law, which establishes a "comparable work" standard.
Jancey v. Sch. Comm. of Everett, 658 N.E.2d 162, 166 (Mass. 1995).
47. Interview with Frett and Peabody, supra note 38.
48. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 184 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of
the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed
under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant
to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earn-
ings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other
factor other than sex.4 9
In Corning Glass Works v. Brennan,50 the Supreme Court recounted Congress's
purpose in enacting the Equal Pay Act, which was:
[T]o remedy what was perceived to be a serious and endemic problem of em-
ployment discrimination in private industry - the fact that the wage structure of"many segments of American industry has been based on an ancient but out-
moded belief that a man, because of his role in society, should be paid more than
a woman even though his duties are the same." 5 1
In Corning Glass Works, for example, the employer had paid male inspectors more
than female inspectors who were doing the same job for the simple reason that the
male inspectors demanded higher pay than what the company had paid to the women
who had historically done the job.52 "That the company took advantage of such a
situation may be understandable as a matter of economics," the Court stated, "but
its differential nevertheless became illegal once Congress enacted into law the
principle of equal pay for equal work."'53
Enforcement of the EPA is in the hands of the federal Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, 54 which has been less than enthusiastic in its pursuit of
equal pay claims in recent years. 55 Women seeking redress under the EPA are
compelled to file lawsuits on their own. They have not fared particularly well.
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court has held that the statute's "broadly reme-
dial" nature demands "it should be construed and applied so as to fulfill the under-
lying purposes which Congress sought to achieve,"'5 6 the federal courts have inter-
preted the EPA narrowly, holding plaintiffs to a high burden of proof. Before
discussing the difficulties of bringing an EPA claim, it is important to examine the
role that Title VII plays in cases of wage discrimination based on gender.
It was only one year following passage of the EPA that Congress passed the
landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964,57 giving employees the right to bring a Title
V1I 5 8 claim against employers who discriminated on the basis of sex, race, or
national origin. 59 While this latter piece of legislation was under debate, concern
49. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2000).
50. 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
51. Id. at 195 (quoting S. REP. No. 176, at 1 (1963)).
52. Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. at 205.
53. Id.
54. 29 C.F.R. § 1620.30(a) (2001).
55. One commentator points out that the EEOC filed seventy-nine EPA cases in 1980. In
1990, the EEOC did not file a single EPA case. Kimberly J. Houghton, The Equal Pay Act of
1963: Where Did We Go Wrong?, 15 LAB. LAw 155, 159 (1999). At the time she published her
article in 1999, Houghton reported that the EEOC had not been a party to a reported decision in
an EPA lawsuit since 1994. Id. at 168.
56. Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 208 (1974).
57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h (1994 & Supp. 2002).
58. Id. § 2000e.
59. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 188 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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arose that the EPA would be rendered a nullity by the broader concept of discrimi-
nation set forth in Title VII. 60 In response to a fear that a Title VII plaintiff could
press a pay discrimination claim without the need to show "equal pay for equal
work" as required by the EPA, Congress enacted the Bennett Amendment, which
incorporated the EPA's four affirmative defenses into Title VII.6 1
In County of Washington v. Gunther,62 the Supreme Court held that the Ben-
nett Amendment did not import the "equal pay for equal work" standard into Title
VII. 63 Rather, a Title VII plaintiff could attempt to prove wage discrimination
based on gender without showing that her work is "equal" to that of a male col-
league. 64 Since Gunther, the federal courts have explored the ways in which an
EPA claim works as compared to a Title VII claim. The courts have settled on a
few basic guidelines in analyzing these claims, which are frequently brought as
separate claims in the same lawsuit.
First, the courts have held that an EPA claimant has the initial burden of prov-
ing her prima facie case, that is, that she is receiving lower pay than a male col-
league who is doing "equal work."'65 Assuming she can get past this hurdle, the
burden then shifts to the employer to prove one of the four affirmative defenses
(seniority, merit, production measures, or "on any other factor other than sex").66
This burden-shifting paradigm is different than that of a Title VII case, in which
the plaintiff maintains the burden of proof throughout the case, with the employer
only having to set forth a plausibly nondiscriminatory reason for engaging in the
conduct that has been alleged to be discriminatory under Title VII.67
Second, the courts have consistently held that a Title VII plaintiff must show
that the employer acted with discriminatory intent, while an EPA claim does not
require a showing of animus. 68 The mere fact that a male colleague performing
the same work is paid more is sufficient to prove the case, without the need to
show that the employer paid the male worker more because he was male or paid
the plaintiff less because she was female. As one district court described the dif-
ference between the two statutes: "It is generally acknowledged that Title VII,
with its broader approach to discrimination, requires a less-exacting degree of job
60. Id. at 191.
61. Id. at 193.
62. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
63. Id. at 179.
64. Id. at 180 (rejecting petitioners' argument that Bennett Amendment requires Title VII
plaintiff bringing wage claim to meet equal pay requirement of the EPA).
65. Stanziale v. Jargowsky, 200 F.3d 101, 107 (3d Cir. 2000).
66. Id. See also Byrd v. Ronayne, 61 F.3d 1026, 1033 (1st Cir. 1995).
67. Lenihan v. Boeing Co., 994 F. Supp. 776, 798 (S.D. Tex. 1998); Glover v. Kindercare
Learning Ctrs., Inc., 980 F Supp. 437, 443 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
68. Sprague v. Thom Americas, Inc., 129F3d 1355, 1364 (10th Cir. 1997); Mitchell v. Jefferson
County Bd. of Educ., 936 F.2d 539, 547 (1lth Cir. 1991). The requirement of showing discrimi-natory intent applies in a "disparate treatment" Title VII case in which the plaintiff alleges the
employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff because of her race, color, sex, reli-
gion, or national origin. Cumpiano v. Banco Santander P.R., 902 F.2d 148, 153 (1st Cir. 1990).
In contrast, a "disparate impact" case brought pursuant to Title VII does not require a showing of
intent, but rather arises as the result of a facially neutral employment practice that has a dispro-
portionately adverse impact on a protected group. McNaim v. Sullivan, 929 F.2d 974, 979 (4th
Cir. 1991). This Article focuses on disparate treatment cases and the requisite showing of dis-
criminatory intent.
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similarity than is necessary to bring an EPA action, with its sharper focus on em-
ployment and wage discrimination against females."'69
Differences aside, the one thing that is clear from the cases is that a plaintiff
bringing a wage discrimination claim, whether pursuant to the EPA, Title VII, or
both (which is usually the case), has her work cut out for her. Many plaintiffs
cannot survive a summary judgment motion, being unable to get past the hurdles
inherent to an EPA claim, as well as the difficulty of proving discrimination in a
Title VII case. 70
In an EPA case, there are two major obstacles that a plaintiff must overcome.
First, she must establish her prima facie case by showing that she is doing "equal
work" to that of a male colleague who is receiving higher pay.7 1 This is a difficult
task. While the federal regulations governing the EPA state that the equal work
standard "does not require that compared jobs be identical, only that they be sub-
stantially equal,"'7 2 there is little guidance for what "substantially equal" means.
The regulations admit that "[wihat constitutes equal skill, equal effort, or equal
responsibility cannot be precisely defined," although the section goes on to state
that interpretation of these key terms must be done with consideration for the "broad
remedial purpose of the law."'73
Interpreting these terms, however, the courts have been reluctant to take a
broad approach. Rather, the courts look at the plaintiff's job and the job of the"comparator" male employee to determine whether there is a "substantial identity
of job functions."'74 The employer can point to many differences between the
plaintiff's duties and those of her comparator to prevent the plaintiff from estab-
lishing her prima facie case. If the male worker has more employees to supervise
or is responsible for a larger budget or greater market share, the courts have held
69. Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 570 A.2d 903, 909 (N.J. 1990). It is beyond the scope
of this Article to explore the differences between the EPA and Title VII and their respective
burdens of proof and persuasion. There is an apparent split in the circuits with respect to how
the Bennett Amendment has affected gender-based wage discrimination cases. See Rodriguez v.
Smithkline Beecham Pharm., 62 F Supp. 2d 374, 381 (D. P.R. 1999), aff'd 224 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2000). For purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to describe the basic differences between an
EPA claim and a Title VII claim.
70. See generally Jordan v. CSX Intermodal, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 754 (D. Md. 1998) (granting
summary judgment on both EPA and Title VII claims); Noel v. Medtronic Electromedics, Inc.,
973 F. Supp. 1206 (D. Colo. 1997); Dinolfo v. Rochester Tele. Corp., 972 F Supp. 718 (W.D.N.Y.
1997).
71. In addition, because the EPA is part of the Fair Labor Standards Act, a plaintiff must first
ensure that she meets the requirements for bringing a claim under that statute. For example, she
must show that the pay discrimination occurred at a single establishment, and she must consider
the broad definition of wages found in the act. See Houghton, supra note 55, at 160-61 (citing
EPA regulations).
72. 29 C.F.R. § 1620.13(a) (2001).
73. Id. § 1620.14(a).
74. Noel v. Medtronic Electromedics, Inc., 973 F. Supp. 1206, 1210 (D. Colo. 1997) (quoting
Nulf v. Int'l Paper Co., 656 F.2d 553, 560-61 (10th Cir. 1981)); Glunt v. GES Exposition Servs.,
Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 847, 856 (S.D. Md. 2000) ("The crucial finding on the equal work issue is
whether the jobs to be compared have a 'common core' of tasks, i.e., whether a significant
portion of the two jobs is identical. The inquiry then turns to whether the differing or additional
tasks make the work substantially different.").
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that the jobs are not substantially equal for purposes of the EPA.75 As one com-
mentator has pointed out, despite the admonition contained in the federal regula-
tions that "insubstantial differences" should not prevent a finding of equal work,
the courts have not "reach[ed] beyond comparisons of virtually identical jobs, which
in a workforce substantially segregated by gender, provides women with a very
limited substantive right indeed."7 6
One commentator describes the "key to success" for a plaintiff in proving a
prima facie case as having "a thorough understanding of the work that everyone at
the organization does and an ability to convey this to the court in a manner that will
allow it to accurately compare skills, effort and responsibility fairly."77 The cases
bear out that plaintiffs who understand how they fit in the workplace have been
able to show that their jobs were "substantially equal" to those of male colleagues.
In Garner v. Motorola, Inc.,78 for example, the plaintiff used an expert to
show that her job as a software engineer was substantially equal to at least four of
her male coworkers and that her responsibilities exceeded those of six other males
who had the same job title.79 She was also able to rely on the employer's charac-
terization of job responsibilities for the software engineers on the performance
appraisal forms used for all of them. 80 Similarly, in McMillan v. Massachusetts
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals,8 1 the plaintiff used the internal
job descriptions for department heads to show that her job responsibilities were
not different from those of other department heads. 82
The one thing the courts are clear on is that while the term "equal" may en-
compass such concepts as "substantially equal," "essentially the same," or "suffi-
ciently similar," it is not broad enough to include "comparable." That is because
"when Congress enacted the Equal Pay Act, it substituted the word 'equal' for'comparable' to show that 'the jobs involved should be virtually identical, that is,
they would be very much alike or closely related to each other.' 8 3
75. In Noel, for example, the plaintiff could not survive summary judgment because she
could not show that the "shared" job duties outnumbered the disparate job functions of the male
comparators, so that she could not prove to the court's satisfaction the "substantial identity of
their job functions." Noel v. Medtronic Electromedics, 973 F. Supp. at 1212. Similarly, in
Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., the plaintiff could not show "substantial equality" of her
work with that of the comparator because she performed some functions that he did not, and vice
versa. 609 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
76. Jennifer M. Quinn, Visibility and Value: The Role of Job Evaluation in Assuring Equal
Pay for Women, 25 LAw & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 1403, 1439 (1994). See also Houghton, supra note
55, at 167 ("The plaintiff must rely on the court's subjective determination that the jobs are
substantially equal and that incidental tasks do not rise to the level of substantial inequality.").
77. Houghton, supra note 55, at 167. The author goes on to describe that a plaintiff's failure
to "understand her employer's business or its job classification system," will result in failure of
her prima facie case unless her job is exactly the same as her male comparator's job. Id.
78. 95 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (D. Ariz. 2000).
79. Id. at 1075.
80. Id.
81. 880 F. Supp. 900 (D. Mass. 1995).
82. Id. at 907. See also Lenihan v. Boeing Co., 994 F. Supp. 776, 800 (S.D. Tex. 1998)
(plaintiff analyzed forty-one duties assigned to members of her work group to show that all
employees were doing substantially equal work).
83. Brennan v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235, 238 (5th Cir. 1973) (quoting 109 CONG. REC.
9197 (1963)). See also EEOC v. Madison Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 12, 818 F.2d 577, 582 (7th
Cir. 1987) (same).
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The second hurdle for an EPA plaintiff is getting past the exceptions set forth
in the statute. In analyzing an EPA claim, the courts have held that seniority and
merit systems must be based on clearly stated and objective criteria and cannot be
used to perpetuate discriminatory patterns of payment.84 The first three defenses
are usually not in issue, probably because the criteria of seniority, merit, and pro-
ductivity are more easily identified and less likely to encourage an EPA claim. In
other words, a woman would be less likely to believe that she is entitled to the
same rate of pay as a male colleague who is senior to her, has higher output, or has
scored higher than her under an objectively applied merit system.
It is the final catch-all defense that has caused the greatest problem for women
pressing an EPA claim. This exception allows an employer to show that it has paid
the male worker more than the plaintiff because of a "factor other than sex" that
justifies the higher payment. 85 Commentators have pointed out that the courts'
very general reading of the fourth statutory exception has reduced the effective-
ness of the EPA and resulted in its being "the most contentious in litigation and the
most pliable to clever defendants." 86
A wage differential based on education or experience has been found to be an
acceptable explanation under the EPA. 87 So unless a plaintiff can show that she is
paid less than a male coworker who has equal or less education and training, or
equal or less experience, her claim is likely to fail. In addition, employers have
defended an equal pay claim using the "any other factor" defense by showing that
they paid the male comparators more because they commanded a higher salary in
their previous jobs. 88 Therefore, even though the courts have disapproved of a"market forces" analysis that would allow an employer to pay a man more because
he demands more and a woman demands less, 89 the courts have allowed the "prior
salary" defense wherein the employer can argue just that.9 0
In sum, the EPA places too great a burden on women who believe they are
being paid less than their male colleagues for doing the same job. The "equal
work" requirement of the EPA as well as a broad interpretation of the "factor other
than sex" affirmative defense make it too hard for a woman to prevail. Only a
84. Glover v. Kindercare Learning Centers, Inc., 980 F. Supp. 437,444-45 (M.D. Ala. 1997);
Sargis v. Amoco Corp., 996 F. Supp. 790, 796 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
85. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(iv) (2000).
86, L. Tracee Whitley, "Any Other Factor Other than Sex:" Forbidden Market Defenses and
the Subversion of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 2 NU FORUM 51, 60 (1997). Whitely opines that
federal courts have largely ignored the Supreme Court's directive in Corning Glass against the
use of market force defenses. Id. at 66.
87. Hutchins v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 177 F.3d 1076, 1081 (8th Cir. 1999). The affirmative
defense that the male worker has additional formal education is only applicable when that supe-rior formal education is actually "relevant and necessary to the job in question." Glunt v. GES
Expsition Services, Inc., 123 F Supp. 2d 847, 860 (D. Md. 2000).
88. Garner v. Motorola, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1076 (D. Ariz. 2000).
89. Dubowsky v. Stem, Lavinthal, Norgaard & Daly, 922 F. Supp. 985, 993 (D. N.J. 1996)
("It is not legitimate under the EPA to pay an equally qualified woman less than a man because
of her inferior bargaining power in the market as a woman."). See also Siler-Khodr v. Univ. of
Tex. Health Science Ctr. San Antonio, 261 F.3d 542, 549 (5th Cir. 2001) (rejecting University's
market forces argument that it had to pay higher salary to recruit male comparator).
90. At least one circuit has held that the "prior salary" differential "standing alone" cannot
defeat an equal pay claim, but must be considered in conjunction with other factors. Lenihan v.
Boeing Co., 994 F. Supp. 776, 798 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (citing Irby v. Bittick, 44 F.3d 989, 955
(llth Cir. 1995)).
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plaintiff who is doing exactly the same work as a male colleague and has the same
level of education and experience as that of a male colleague can hope for success
in an EPA case. Almost forty years after its passage, the EPA has done little to
promote a solution to the "serious and endemic problem" of wage discrimination
for which it was designed.9 1
C. Other States' Equal Pay Laws
There are thirty-nine states that have statutes that deal specifically with pay
equity for men and women.92 The following is a description of the various catego-
ries of state statutes.
1. Equal Work States
Seventeen states have statutes modeled on the federal EPA in that they require
employers to pay female workers at the same wage rate as male workers for "equal
work": California, 93 Delaware, 94 Florida,9 5 Georgia, 96 Indiana,97 Kansas,9 8 Min-
91. Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974).
92. The eleven states that do not have a specific pay equity law on their books are Alabama,
Alaska, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Utah,
and Wisconsin. In Alabama, a bill was introduced in the 2002 state legislative session that
would have created a statute requiring equal pay for women doing "equivalent" jobs of men, but
the bill did not pass. H.B. 295, 2002 Leg., 22d Sess. (Ala. 2002). Alaska used to have an equal
pay statute, but it was repealed in 1965, when Alaska enacted its human rights statute. ALASKA
STAT. § 18.80.220(a)(1) (Michie 2001). Most, if not all, states have human rights statutes that
prohibit discrimination in employment, including the payment of compensation, on the basis of
gender, race, ethnic origin, disability, or other protected class. Maine's human rights statute, for
example, prohibits discrimination in the payment of compensation based on race, sex, physical
or mental disability, religion, age, ancestry, or national origin. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4572(1)(A) (2002).
These more general nondiscrimination statutes provide a means of pressing a wage discrimina-
tion claim in states that do not have a specific pay-equity law.
93. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1197.5 (West Supp. 2002).
No employer shall pay any individual in the employer's employ at wage rates less
than the rates paid to employees of the opposite sex in the same establishment for
equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and respon-
sibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where the
payment is made pursuant to a seniority system, a merit system, a system which mea-
sures earnings by quantity or quality of production, or a differential based on any
bona fide factor other than sex.
Id.
94. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1107A (2001).
No employees shall be paid a wage at a rate less than a rate at which an employee of
the opposite sex in the same establishment is paid for equal work on a job the perfor-
mance of which requires equal skill, effort and responsibility, and which is performed
under similar working conditions, except where payment is made pursuant to a differ-
ential based on: (1) A seniority system; (2) A merit system; (3) A system which mea-
sures earnings by quantity or quality or production; or (4) Any other factor other than
sex.
Id.
95. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.07 (West Supp. 2001).
No employer shall discriminate between employees on the basis of sex by paying
wages to employees at a rate less than the rate at which he or she pays wages to
employees of the opposite sex for equal work on jobs the performance of which re-
quires equal skill, effort and responsibility, and which are performed under similar
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nesota,9 9 Nebraska, 100 Nevada, 10 1 New Hampshire, 102 New York, 103 Ohio, 104
working conditions, except when such payment is made pursuant to: (1) A seniority
system; (2) A merit system; (3) A system which measures earnings by quantity or
quality of production; (4) A differential based on any reasonable factor other than sex
when exercised in good faith.
Id.
96. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 34-5-3 (1998 & Supp. 2001).
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this chapter shall dis-
criminate, withinany establishment in which such employees are employed, between
employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at
a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in
such establishment for equal work in jobs which require equal skill, effort, and re-
sponsibility and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where
such payment is made pursuant to (1) a seniority system, (2) a merit system, (3) a
system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production, or (4) a differ-
ential based on any other factor other than sex.
Id. Georgia's statute is interesting in that the "declaration of public policy" set forth in the first
section of the statute states that discriminating on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees
of one sex at a lesser rate than the rate paid to employees of the opposite sex for "comparable
work in jobs which require the same, or essentially the same, knowledge, skill, effort and re-
sponsibility" leads to a number of social ills. Id. § 34-5-1 (emphasis added). The enforcement
section of the statute, however, prohibits employers from paying unequal wages between the
sexes for "equal work in jobs which require equal skill, effort, and responsibility and which are
performed under similar working conditions." Id. § 34-5-3.
97. IND. CODE § 22-2-2-4(d) (Supp. 2001).
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall dis-
criminate, within any establishment in which employees are employed, between em-
ployees on the basis of sex by paying to employees in such establishment a rate less
than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such estab-
lishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort,
and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except
where such payment is made pursuant to: (1) a seniority system; (2) a merit system;
(3) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (4) a
differential based on any other factor other than sex.
Id.
98. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1205 (2001).
[N]o employer having employees of both sexes shall discriminate, within any estab-
lishment in which such employees are employed, between employees on the basis of
sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate of
wages paid to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on
jobs, the performance of which requires equal skill, effort and responsibility, and which
are performed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made
pursuant to: (a) A seniority system; (b) a merit system; (c) a system which measures
earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (d) a differential based on a factor
other than sex.
Id.
99. MINN. STAT. § 181.67(1) (2000).
No employer shall discriminate between employees on the basis of sex by paying
wages to employees at a rate less than the rate the employer pays to employees of the
opposite sex for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill,
effort and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions,
except where such payment is made pursuant to a seniority system, a merit system, a
system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production, or a differential
based on any other factor other than sex.
Id.
100. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-1221(1) (Michie 2001).
No employer shall discriminate between employees in the same establishment on the
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basis of sex, by paying wages to any employee in such establishment at a wage rate
less than the rate at which the employer pays any employee of the opposite sex in
such establishment for equal work on jobs which require equal skill, effort and re-
sponsibility under similar working conditions. Wage differentials are not within this
prohibition where such payments are made pursuant to: (a) An established seniority
system; (b) a merit increase system; or (c) a system which measures earnings by quantity
or quality of production or any factor other than sex.
Id.
101. NEV. REV. STAT. 608.017(t)-(2) (2001).
1. It is unlawful for any employer to discriminate between employees, employed
within the same establishment, on the basis of sex by paying lower wages to one
employee than the wages paid to an employee of the opposite sex who performs equal
work which requires equal skill, effort and responsibility and which is performed
under similar working conditions. 2. The provisions of subsection 1 do not apply
where wages are paid pursuant to: (a) A seniority system; (b) A merit system; (c) A
compensation system under which wages are determined by the quality or quantity of
production; or (d) A wage differential based on factors other than sex.
Id.
102. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:37 (2000).
No employer shall discriminate in the payment of wages as between the sexes, or
shall pay any employee in his or her employ salary or wage rates less than the rates
paid to employees of the opposite sex for equal work or work on the same operations.
However, nothing in this subdivision shall prohibit a variation in rates of pay based
upon a marked difference in seniority, experience, training, skill, ability, or difference
in duties and services performed, either regularly or occasionally, or difference in the
shift or time of the day worked, or difference in availability for other operation, or
other reasonable differentiation except difference in sex. A variation in rates of pay as
between the sexes is not prohibited where such variation is provided by contract be-
tween the employer and the recognized bargaining agent of the employees or, in case
there is no such bargaining agent, where such variation is provided by written agree-
ment or contract between the employer and not less than 5 of the employees.
Id.
103. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 194 (McKinney 2001).
No employee shall be paid a wage at a rate less than the rate at which an employee of
the opposite sex in the same establishment is paid for work on a job the performance
of which requires equal skill, effort and responsibility, and which is performed under
similar working conditions, except where payment is made pursuant to a differential
based on (a) a seniority system; (b) a merit system; (c) a system which measures
earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (d) any other factor other than sex.
Id.
104. Ofrlo REV. CODE ANN. § 4111.17 (West 2001).
(A) No employer, including the state and political subdivisions thereof, shall dis-
criminate in the payment of wages on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, age, na-
tional origin, or ancestry by paying wages to any employee at a rate less than the rate
at which the employer pays wages to another employee for equal work on jobs the
performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are
performed under similar conditions. (B) Nothing in this section prohibits an em-
ployer from paying wages to one employee at a rate different from that at which the
employer pays another employee for the performance of equal work under similar
conditions on jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility, when payment is
made pursuant to any of the following: (1) A seniority system; (2) A merit system; (3)
A system which measures earnings by the quantity or quality of production; (4) A
wage rate differential determined by any other factor than race, color, religion, sex,
age, national origin, or ancestry.
[Vol. 55:1
20021 THE UNENFORCED PROMISE OF EQUAL PAY ACTS 39
Pennsylvania, 105 Rhode Island, 106 Vermont, 107 Virginia, 108 and Wyoming. 109 The
fact that these state statutes require a showing of "equal work" and contain the
same exceptions as the federal EPA make it just as difficult to prove wage dis-
crimination under these statutes as it is under the EPA.
105. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 336.3 (2001).
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall dis-
criminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, between
employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at
a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in
such establishment for equal work on jobs, the performance of which, requires equal
skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working con-
ditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (1) a seniority system; (2) a
merit system; (3) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of produc-
tion; or (4) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.
Id.
106. R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-6-18 (2001).
No employer shall discriminate in the payment of wages as between the sexes or pay
any female in his employ salary or wage rates less than the rates paid to male employ-
ees for equal work or work on the same operations; provided, that nothing contained
in this section shall prohibit a variation in rates of pay based upon either difference in
seniority, experience, training, skill, or ability, or difference in duties and services
performed, either regularly or occasionally, or difference in the shift or time of day
worked, or difference in availability for other operations or any other reasonable dif-
ferentiation except difference in sex.
Id.
107. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495(a)(8) (2002).
(a) It shall be unlawful employment practice ... [f]or any employer, employment
agency, labor organization or person seeking employees to discriminate between em-
ployees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees of one sex at a rate less than
the rate paid to employees of the other sex for equal work that requires equal skill,
effort and responsibility, and is performed under similar working conditions. ... An
employer may pay different wage rates under this subsection when the differential
wages are made pursuant to: (A) A seniority system, (B) A merit system, (C) A sys-
tem in which earnings are based on quantity or quality of production, (D) Any factor
other than sex.
Id.
108. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.6 (Michie 2001).
No employer having employees shall discriminate, within any establishment in which
such employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying
wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays
wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs
the performance of which requires equal skill, effort and responsibility, and which are
performed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made
pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures
earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other
factor other than sex.
Id.
109. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-4-302 (Michie 2001).
No employer shall discriminate, within the same establishment in which the employ-
ees are employed, between employees on the basis of gender by paying wages to
employees at a rate less than the rate at which the employer pays wages to employees
of the opposite gender for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires
equal skill, effort and responsibility and which are performed under similar working
conditions, except where the payment is made pursuant to: (i) A seniority system; (ii)
A merit system; (iii) A system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of
production; or (iv) A differential based on any other factor other than gender.
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2. Comparable Work States
Eleven states have a statute similar to Maine's, that is, requiring employers to
pay women the same wage as men for "comparable work." Those states are Ar-
kansas, 110 Idaho, 111 Kentucky, 112 Maryland,1 13 Massachusetts, 114 North Da-
kota,115 Oklahoma, 116 Oregon, 117 South Dakota,118 Tennessee, 119 and West Vir-
110. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 11-4-610(a) (Michie 2002).
(a) No employer shall discriminate in the payment of wages as between the sexes or
shall pay any female in his employ salary or wage rates less than the rates paid to male
employees for comparable work. (b) Nothing in §§ 11-4-607-11-4-612 shall pro-
hibit a variation in rates of pay based upon a difference in seniority, experience, train-
ing, skill, ability, differences in duties and services performed, difference in the shift
or time of the day worked, or any other reasonable differentiation except difference in
sex.
Id.
111. IDAHO CODE § 44-1702(1) (Michie 2000).
No employer shall discriminate between or among employees in the same establish-
ment on the basis of sex, by paying wages to any employee in any occupation in this
state at a rate less than the rate at which he pays any employee of the opposite sex for
comparable work on jobs which have comparable requirements relating to skill, effort
and responsibility. Differentials which are paid pursuant to established seniority sys-
tems or merit increase systems, which do not discriminate on the basis of sex, are not
within this prohibition.
Id.
112. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 337.423 (Banks-Baldwin 2001).
No employer shall discriminate between employees in the same establishment on the
basis of sex, by paying wages to any employee in any occupation in this state at a rate
less than the rate at which he pays any employee of the opposite sex for comparable
work on jobs which have comparable requirements relating to skill, effort and respon-
sibility. Differentials which are paid pursuant to established seniority systems or
merit increase systems, which do not discriminate on the basis of sex, shall not be
included within this prohibition.
Id.
113. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-304(a), (b) (2001).
(a) An employer may not discriminate between employees in any occupation by pay-
ing a wage to employees of 1 sex at a rate less than the rate paid to employees of the
opposite sex if both employees work in the same establishment and perform work of
comparable character or work on the same operation, in the same business, or of the
same type.... Subsection (a) of this section does not prohibit a variation in a wage
that is based on: (1) A seniority system that does not discriminate on the basis of sex;
(2) A merit increase system that does not discriminate on the basis of sex; (3) Jobs that
require different abilities or skills; (4) Jobs that require the regular performance of
different duties or services; or (5) Work that is performed on different shifts or at
different times of day.
Id.
114. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 149, § 105A (2001).
No employer shall discriminate in any way in the payment of wages as between sexes,
or pay any person in his employ salary or wage rates less than the rates paid to em-
ployees of the opposite sex for work of like or comparable character or work on like
or comparable operations; provided, however, that variations in rates of pay shall not
be prohibited when based upon a difference in seniority.
Id.
115. N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-06.1-03 (2002).
No employer may discriminate between employees in the same establishment on the
basis of gender, by paying wages to any employee in any occupation in this state at a
rate less than the rate at which the employer pays any employee of the opposite gen-
der for comparable work on jobs which have comparable requirements relating to
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ginia.120 All twelve comparable work state statutes have some variation on the list
of affirmative defenses that employers can assert to defeat an equal pay claim. The
skill, effort, and responsibility. Differentials that are paid pursuant to established
seniority systems, job descriptive systems, merit increase systems, or executive train-
ing programs, and which do not discriminate on the basis of gender, are not within
this prohibition.
Id.
116. OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, § 198.1 (2001).
It shall be unlawful for any employer within the State of Oklahoma to willfully pay
wages to women employees at a rate less than the rate at which he pays any employee
of the opposite sex for comparable work on jobs which have comparable require-
ments relating to skill, effort and responsibility, except where such payment is made
pursuant to a seniority system; a merit system; a system which measures earnings by
quantity or quality of production; or a differential based on any factor other than sex.
Id.
117. OR. REv. STAT. § 652.220(1), (2) (1999).
No employer shall: (a) In any manner discriminate between the sexes in payment of
wages for work of comparable character, the performance of which requires compa-
rable skills. (b) Pay wages to any employee at a rate less than that at which the
employer pays wages to employees of the opposite sex for work of comparable char-
acter, the performance of which requires comparable skills. (2) Subsection (1) of this
section does not apply where: (a) Payment is made pursuant to a seniority or merit
system which does not discriminate on the basis of sex. (b) A differential in wages
between employees is based in good faith on factors other than sex.
Id.
118. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-12-15 (Michie 2001).
No employer shall discriminate between employees on the basis of sex, by paying
wages to any employee in any occupation in this state-at a rate less than the rate at
which he pays any employee of the opposite sex for comparable work on jobs which
have comparable requirements relating to skill, effort and responsibility, but not to
physical strength.... Differentials which are paid pursuant to established seniority
systems, job descriptive systems, merit increase systems, or executive training pro-
grams, which do not discriminate on the basis of sex, are not within the prohibition of
§ 60-12-15.
Id. at §§ 60-12-15 to 60-12-16.
119. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-2-202 (2001).
No employer shall discriminate between employees in the same establishment on the
basis of sex by paying any employee salary or wage rate less than the rates such
employer pays to any employee of the opposite sex for comparable work on jobs the
performance of which require comparable skill, effort and responsibility, and which
are performed under similar working conditions. However, nothing in this part shall
prohibit wage differentials based on a seniority system, a merit system, a system which
measures earnings by quality or quantity or production, or any other reasonable dif-
ferential which is based on a factor other than sex.
Id.
120. W. VA. CODEANN. § 21-5B-3(1), (2) (Michie 2001).
No employer shall (a) [i]n any manner discriminate between the sexes in payment of
wages for work of comparable character, the performance of which requires compa-
rable skills; (b) pay wages to any employee at a rate less than that at which he pays
wages to his employees of the opposite sex for work of comparable character, the
performance of which requires comparable skills. (2) Subsection (1) of this section
does not apply where: (a) Payment is made pursuant to a seniority or merit system
which does not discriminate on the basis of sex, (b) a differential in wages between
employees is based in good faith on factors other than sex.
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Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, and West Virginia "comparable work" statutes con-
tain a "catch-all" affirmative defense that creates a large opportunity for employ-
ers to argue that a "factor other than sex" dictated higher pay for the male com-
parator.12 1 Arkansas, Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland, Maine, Massachusetts, and South
Dakota have limited lists of exceptions to the law, giving employers less wiggle
room to avoid an equal pay claim.
There is not a great deal of case law interpreting these comparable work stat-
utes. As noted above, there are no reported cases dealing with Maine's equal pay
law. 122 The last reported case brought under Kentucky's law was in 1972, when
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an employee could not be penalized
for failing to exhaust her administrative remedies when she did not refer her com-
plaint to the state department of labor.123 The case does not provide any guidance
on how the "comparable work" standard should be interpreted. 124
Only Maryland, Massachusetts, and Oregon have reported cases discussing
the comparable work standard contained in those states' pay equity statutes. In
Maryland, the courts recognize that the Maryland Equal Pay Act uses a "compa-
rable work" standard that is different from the "equal work" standard set forth in
the federal Equal Pay Act, but they do not draw a distinction when analyzing a
claim brought under the state law. 125 Plaintiffs may fare a bit better in Oregon,
where the courts recognize that the state statute's "comparable work" standard is
"broader" than equal work: "'Comparable' does not require equality but that two
items have important common characteristics." 126 In a 1986 case, the Oregon
Appellate Court held that "[ilt is not difficult for a plaintiff to make a prima facie
case under [Oregon's statute]. Plaintiffs simply had to show that they were per-
forming work comparable to that of male teachers and that they were paid less than
male teachers."' 127 In these Oregon cases, however, the issue of what constitutes"comparable work" was not squarely before the court, because the plaintiffs had
met the higher burden of showing that their work was equal or "substantially simi-
lar" to the male comparators. 12 8
A Massachusetts case provides the most definitive statements on the "compa-
rable work" standard. In Jancey v. School Committee of Everett,129 female cafete-
ria workers brought a complaint against the school committee, alleging violations
121. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
122. See supra.note 46 and accompanying text.
123. Mitchell v. Mid-Continent Spring Co. of Ky., 466 F.2d 24, 27 (6th Cir. 1972).
124. Id.
125. Glunt v. GES Exposition Servs., Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 847, 862 (S.D. Md. 2000) (citing
Hassman v. Valley Motors, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 564 (D. Md. 1992); Nixon v. Maryland, 625 A.2d
404 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993)).
126. Bureau of Labor & Indus. v. City of Roseburg, 706 P.2d 956, 959 n.2 (Or. Ct. App.
1985). See also Smith v. Bull Run Sch. Dist. No. 45, 722 P.2d 27, 29 (Or. App. Ct. 1986)
(holding that comparable work is more inclusive term).
127. Smith v. Bull Run Sch. Dist. No. 45, 722 P.2d at 29.
128. In Smith, the plaintiffs, female teachers, proved their work was equal to the male teach-
ers in their district. Id. In City of Roseburg, the plaintiff, who was Transit Coordinator for the
City, did work that the Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor and Industries found was "sub-
stantially similar" to other division heads, who were paid at a higher level on the wage scale.
Bureau of Labor & Indus. v. City of Roseburg, 706 P.2d at 959. The court acknowledged that the
test applied by the Commissioner for "substantially similar work" was a stricter test than "com-
parable work." Id.
129. 658 N.E.2d 162 (Mass. 1995).
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of the Massachusetts antidiscrimination act, the state and federal equal pay laws,
as well as various constitutional claims. 130 The cafeteria workers, who had al-
ways been female, proved that the custodian workers, who had always been male,
were paid twice what the cafeteria workers were paid. 13 1 The trial court deter-
mined whether the cafeteria workers' jobs were comparable in character to the
custodians' jobs by assessing whether the work required comparable skill, effort,
responsibility, and working conditions, and determined that the jobs were compa-
rable. 132 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts concluded that the trial
judge had "applied the wrong standard in deciding that the work of the two groups
was of comparable character.....,133 The court concluded that
in applying the broader "comparable" standard, the statute requires a two-part
analysis. First, the judge must determine whether the substantive content of the
jobs is comparable, that is, whether the duties of the jobs have, "important com-
mon characteristics .. . To ignore job content when applying the "comparable"
standard is to attempt the impossible task of comparing disparate concepts. In
other words two positions that are so dissimilar in their substantive content that a
reasonable person would regard them as categorically separate are not "compa-
rable."
It is only when a determination is made that the jobs are comparable in substan-
tive content, that the second inquiry is appropriate - whether the two positions
entail comparable skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions. If the an-
swer to both inquiries is "Yes," then employees in the two positions must receive
equal pay. 134
By establishing a two-part analysis that goes beyond the actual language of the
Massachusetts Equal Pay Act, the Jancey court set a very high standard for plain-
tiffs to meet when attempting to prove that their work is comparable to that of the
male comparators. One commentator criticized the opinion, noting that the court"callously disregarded the statute's language when it created the two-part compa-
rable work standard." 135 This reviewer further noted that:
The Jancey court failed to acknowledge that the Massachusetts legislature's re-
fusal to adopt FEPA's equal work standard indicates an intent not to narrowly
confine MEPA to situations involving "substantially similar" job content....
MEPA merely requires a more liberal comparison of the jobs'characteristics rather
than focusing solely on their content. By requiring the positions in question to
possess "important common characteristics," the Jancey decision effectively ne-
gates the comparable worth theory's objective of preventing male and female
segregated occupations, and implicitly strips MEPA of its intended coverage. 136
Two Massachusetts practitioners observed that Jancey limited Massachusetts state
equal pay claims "only to relatively blatant instances of discriminatory payment of
130. Id. at 164-65.
131. Id. at 165.
132. Id. at 166.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 167-68 (citing Bureau of Labor & Indus. v. City of Roseburg, 706 P.2d 956, 959
n.2 (Or. Ct. App. 1985)).
135. Lisa J. Bradford, Note, Comparable Substantive Job Content Necessary for Recovery
Under Massachusetts Equal Pay Act-Jancey v. School Committee, 421 Mass. 482,658 N.E.2d
162 (1995), 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 307, 315 (1996).
136. Id. at 315-16 (footnotes omitted).
wages across gender lines." 137 Women workers in Massachusetts will not read
Jancey as an encouragement to bring a claim under that state's equal pay act. In-
deed, as the only case setting forth a standard for interpreting comparable work,
Jancey is discouraging to all potential claimants in states with comparable work
statutes.
3. "Same" or "Similar" States
Six states have statutes that do not specify that the work must be "equal" or"comparable," but do use other terms to describe the standard. Three of those
states, Arizona, 138 Missouri, 139 and Montana, 14 0 can be grouped with the "equal
work" states in that they require a showing that the work in issue is the "same" for
the female worker as the male comparator. Three other states, Illinois, 14 1 Michi-
137. Margaret M. Pinkham & Emanuel Alves, Employment Law Decisions: A First Look at
the Massachusetts Equal Pay Act, and a Second Look at Employee Handbooks as Contracts, 41
BOSTON B.J., Jan./Feb. 1997, at 10, 11.
138. ARIz. REV. STAT. § 23-341(A) (1995).
No employer shall pay any person in his employ at wage rates less than the rates paid
to employees of the opposite sex in the same establishment for the same quantity and
quality of the same classification of work, provided that nothing herein shall prohibit
a variation of rates of pay for [male and female] seniority, length of service, ability,
skill, difference in duties or services performed, whether regularly or occasionally,
difference in the shift or time of day worked, hours of work, or restrictions or prohibi-
tions on lifting or moving objects in excess of specified weight, or other reasonable
differentiation, factor or factors other than sex, when exercised in good faith.
Id.
139. Mo. REV. STAT. § 290.410 (1995).
[N]o employer shall pay any female in his employ at wage rates less than the wage
rates paid to male employees in the same establishment for the same quantity and
quality of the same classification of work, provided that nothing herein shall prohibit
a variation of rates of pay for male and female employees engaged in the same classi-
fication of work based upon a difference in seniority, length of service, ability, skill,
difference in duties or services performed, difference in the shift or time of day worked,
hours of work, or restrictions or prohibitions on lifting or moving objects in excess of
specified weight, or other reasonable differentiation, or factors other than sex, when
exercised in good faith.
Id.
140. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-3-104(1) (2001).
It is unlawful for the state or any county, municipal entity, school district, public or
private corporation, person, or firm to employ women in any occupation within the
state for compensation less than that paid to men for equivalent service or for the
same amount or class of work or labor in the same industry, school, establishment,
office or place of employment of any kind or description.
Id. Montana's statute makes it a misdemeanor to violate this section. Id. § 39-3-104(2).
141. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/4 (West 1999).
No employer shall discriminate between employees on the basis of sex or mental or
physical handicap, except as otherwise provided by this Act by paying wages to em-
ployees at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees for the same
or substantially similar work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill,
effort and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions,
except where such payment is made pursuant to (1) a seniority system; (2) a merit
system; (3) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or
(4) a differential based on any other factor than sex or mental or physical handicap.
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gan, 142 and Washington, 143 use the term "similar" when describing the work, there-
fore putting them more in the "comparable work" camp. Michigan, Montana, and
Washington are interesting in that they have criminal statutes, making violation of
the statute a misdemeanor. In Michigan and Washington an individual who has
had her rights violated also has the right to bring a civil action. 144
4. Policy Statement States
Four states, Colorado, 14 5 Connecticut, 146 Hawaii, 147 and New Jersey, 14 8 do
142. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.556 (1991)."
Any employer of labor in this state, employing both males and females, who shall
discriminate in any way in the payment of wages as between sexes who are similarly
employed, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. No female shall be assigned any task
disproportionate to her strength, nor shall she be employed in any place detrimental to
her morals, her health or her potential capacity for motherhood. Any difference in
wage rates based upon a factor other than sex shall not violate this section.
Id.
143. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.12.175 (West 2000).
Any employer in this state, employing both males and females, who shall discrimi-
nate in any way in the payment of wages as between sexes or who shall pay any
female a less wage, be it time or piece work, or salary, than is being paid to males
similarly employed, or in any employment formerly performed by males, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id. The statute further provides a civil cause of action to recover wages lost due to discrimina-
tion. Id.
144. In St. John v. Gen. Motors Corp., 13 N.W.2d 840, 841 (Mich. 1944), the Michigan
Supreme Court held that "[i]f plaintiff has suffered financial damage by reason of defendant's
noncompliance with the mandatory provisions of the statute applicable to claimants' employ-
ment then civil action may be maintained." Id. at 841. The Washington state statute provides:
[i]f any female employee shall receive less compensation because of being discrimi-
nated against on account of her sex, and in violation of this section, she shall be
entitled to recover in a civil action the full amount of compensation that she would
have received had she not been discriminated against.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.12.175 (West 2000). In Montana there is no reference to a civil
cause of action or recovery for damages that result from wage discrimination. MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 39-3-104 (2001).
145. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-5-102 (West 2001) ("No employer shall make any discrimina-
tion in the amount or rate of wages or salary paid or to be paid his employees in employment in
this state solely on account of sex thereof.").
146. CONN. GEN. STAT. STATE ANN. § 31-75 (West 1997).
No employer shall discriminate in the amount of compensation paid to any employee
solely on the basis of sex. Any difference in pay based on sex shall be deemed a
discrimination within the meaning of this section, provided nothing herein shall be
deemed to prevent the operation of employment practices which recognize length of
service or merit rating as a factor in determining wage or salary rates.
Id.
147. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 387-4 (Michie 1993).
No employer shall discriminate in any way in the payment of wages as between per-
sons of different races or religions or as between the sexes; provided that nothing
herein shall prohibit a variation of rates of pay for employees engaged in the same
classification of work based upon a difference in seniority, length of service, substan-
tial difference in duties or services performed, difference in the shift or time of day
worked, or hours of work.
Id.
148. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56.2 (West 2000).
No employer shall discriminate in any way in the rate or method of payment of wages
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not specify a standard of work, but merely prohibit wage discrimination based on
sex. Without the requirement of a showing that the work is "equal" or even "com-
parable" to the male comparators, these state statutes are more in the nature of
policy statements. It could be argued that the equal pay statutes in these four states
are the broadest of all such laws and the easiest to prove. There are few reported
cases in these jurisdictions to show that women are taking advantage of the broad
language. 149
In New Jersey, the state's Supreme Court described the New Jersey Equal Pay
Act as "dormant," which was "explained in part by the circumstance that other
legislative schemes have been invoked to supplement its protective measures and
assure its societal goals."' 150 There are two federal cases in which a plaintiff added
a New Jersey Equal Pay Act claim to her federal EPA and Title VII claims. In these
cases, similar to the Maryland cases cited above, 15 1 the court simply imported the
federal EPA standard into the state statute claim without acknowledging that the
New Jersey statute does not require a showing of "equal work" or even "compa-
rable work."' 152 This is hardly encouraging for New Jersey women who want to
bring claims under what appears to be a broad statutory scheme. When courts fail
to interpret broad state statutes broadly, women will not see the courts as a place to
go to vindicate their rights.
5. Bringing a State Law Claim
Despite the rather discouraging interpretation of state equal pay statutes to
date, women who bring such claims are, for the most part, compelled to bring
those claims in court. That being the case, there are reasons why a woman might
find it preferable to bring a claim pursuant to a state equal pay law as opposed to a
federal EPA claim.
First, with the exception of the eleven states that do not have a specific pay-
equity statute, a plaintiff bringing an action pursuant to an equal pay statute will
not be required to exhaust administrative remedies, such as she would be required
to do in bringing most employment discrimination claims. 153 While an individual
seeking recovery pursuant to the federal EPA is not required to bring a complaint
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, she will lose the support of
to any employee because of his or her sex. A differential in pay between employees
based on a reasonable factor or factors other than sex shall not constitute discrimina-
tion within the meaning of this section.
Id.
149. In Colorado and Hawaii, there are no reported cases showing how the courts would
interpret their statutes.
150. Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 570 A.2d 903, 911 (N.J. 1990).
151. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
152. Hodgkins v. Kontes Chemistry & Life Sciences Prod., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2293, at
*47 (D. N.J. 2000) (citing Dobowsky v. Stem, Lavinthal, Norgaard & Daly, 922 F. Supp. 985,
996 (D. N.J. 1996)).
153. Bass v. Great W. Savs. & Loan Ass'n, 130 Cal. Rptr. 123, 125 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)
(plaintiff was not required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing a claim pursuant
to the state's equal pay statute).
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that agency if she fails to do so. 1 5 4 If she intends to file a Title VII action in
conjunction with her EPA claim, which most plaintiffs do, she must file either with
the EEOC or her state's human rights commission first. 155 In addition, state hu-
man rights statutes usually contain similar limitations on court actions if the claim-
ant fails to pursue her claim administratively before filing in court. 156
Second, many of the states have a process that requires the state department of
labor to step in when it receives a complaint, conduct an investigation, and in some
cases, bring an action on behalf of the plaintiff. 15 7 Having the state act on behalf
of the complainant is far less threatening than a plaintiff having to bring a com-
plaint on her own or file a lawsuit.
In Connecticut, one of the policy statement states, for example, a woman can
bring a claim pursuant to the equal pay law found in the labor statutes or pursuant
to the Human Rights Act. 158 If she brings her claim pursuant to the human rights
provision, however, she must exhaust that administrative process before she can
bring a civil action. If she brings her claim directly to the labor department she
does not have to exhaust administrative remedies; the statute specifically gives her
a private right of action independent of the labor department. 15 9 She may prefer to
have the labor department pursue the claim, especially considering the broad right
of inspection given to the agency. In addition, she may assign her wage claim "in
trust" to the commissioner, who is empowered to bring a legal action against her
employer on her behalf.160 Being one step removed from the legal action and
having the state act on her behalf provide crucial support to a woman who is reluc-
tant to bring an action herself.
154. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Filing a Charge, available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/howtofil.html.
Individuals are not required to file an EPA charge with EEOC before filing a private
lawsuit. However, charges may be filed with EEOC and some cases of wage dis-
crimination also may be violations of Title VII. If an EPA charge is filed with EEOC,
the procedure for filing is the same as for charges brought under Title VII. However,
the time limits for filing in court are different under the EPA, thus, it is advisable to
file a charge as soon as you become aware the EPA may have been violated.
Id.
155. Id.
156. In Maine, for example, an aggrieved individual seeking to bring an employment dis-
crimination action pursuant to the Maine Human Rights Act must file a complaint with the
Maine Human Rights Commission and, if the case is not resolved, request the Commission to
issue a right-to-sue letter. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4612(6) (2002). If the claimant does not proceed
through the Commission's administrative process, she will be denied civil penal damages, com-
pensatory damages, and punitive damages, as well as attorney's fees if she prevails in court. Id.
§ 4622(1).
157. In Maine, for example, the state's Bureau of Labor Standards upon receiving a com-
plaint must conduct an investigation and determine whether there is "reasonable cause" to be-
lieve wage discrimination has occurred. Me. Dep't of Lab. Reg. 12.170 § III(F)(1) & (2) (Nov.
19, 2001). See discussion infra Part IV. Among other states that allow or require the state
agency to investigate a complaint and act on behalf of a complainant are Kentucky, New Jersey,
North Dakota, and Ohio. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 337.427(4) (Banks-Baldwin 2002); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 34:11-56.4 (West 2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34.06.1-05 (2001); OHlo REV. CODE ANN. §
4111.17(D) (West 2002).
158. Foster v. Yankelovich Partners, Inc., No. CV 960151765, 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS
3220, at *6-7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 5, 1996). See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-62 (2002) (providing
that no provision of the Human Rights Act "may be construed to void or supersede" the statute
prohibiting wage discrimination based on sex).
159. Foster v. Yankelovich Partners, Inc., 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3220, at *7.
160. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-76 (1997).
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One would think that the greatest advantage that many of these states offer to
women is that the standard of proof will not be as high as it is in federal court. For
women in the states listed above that have a "comparable work" or "similar work"
standard and in the states that do not set a standard at all, it should be easier to
prove an equal pay claim than under the federal EPA. As discussed above, how-
ever, the courts interpreting these broader state statutes seem uncomfortable with
standards beyond "equal work." The Jancey case in Massachusetts, for example,
sets a very high standard for plaintiffs to bring an equal pay claim, despite the fact
that the state law in issue is one of the broadest in the country.16 1
This could be one reason why women in these states are not bringing more
equal pay cases. Officials in states with a "comparable work" or "policy state-
ment" statute report that they do not receive complaints on which to act. 16 2 Even
if they do receive calls from women complaining that they are not receiving equal
pay, some states take the position that the state human rights commission is better
equipped to handle such a case and refer the callers to those entities. 16 3
The courts' failure to uphold state equal pay law claims suggests that there is
a need to find a more welcoming forum. The states' administrative processes could
be the best solution for women seeking to bring equal pay claims. Kentucky and
Maine are the only "comparable work" states that have regulations governing their
equal pay statutes. Kentucky's regulations, however, are almost a mirror image of
the federal regulations governing the EPA, without provision for bringing an ad-
ministrative claim. 164 Maine is the only "comparable work" state that provides an
administrative process for bringing an equal pay claim.165 Before discussing
Maine's administrative process, however, it is useful to touch briefly on the con-
cept of "comparable worth," which goes far beyond what was intended in the fed-
eral EPA as well as the state statutes.
161. See supra notes 129-37 and accompanying text.
162. A representative of Colorado's Department of Labor and Employment is not aware of
any complaints having been processed under its equal pay statute. E-mail from Dick Hernandez,
Colo. Dept. of Labor and Employment (May 1, 2002, 11:22 A.M.) (on file with author). In
Maryland, the Division of Employment Standards has not received a complaint in at least seven
years. Telephone Interview with Richard Sebeck, Md. Div. of Employment Standards (June 14,
2002). According to a Labor Compliance Officer in Oklahoma, there has not been a complaint
in seven years. Telephone Interview with Deborah Metheney, Okla. Dept. of Labor (June 13,
2002).
163. In Idaho, for example, the statute specifies that the Human Rights Commission will
enforce the statute. IDAHO CODE § 44-1701 (Michie 2000). According to Fred Fromme, an
investigator with the Human Rights Commission, the agency has not had a complaint in two
years. Telephone interview with Fred Fromme, Idaho Human Rights Comm'n (July 18, 2002).
In Illinois, the Fair Labor Standards Division refers wage discrimination claims to the state's
Human Rights Commission or the United States Department of Labor. Telephone interview
with Mary Nagle, Dir. of Fair Labor Standards Div. of the I1l. Dept. of Labor (June 19, 2002).
The Kentucky Division of Employment Standards has seen very few complaints and generally
refers discrimination claims to the human rights commission. Telephone Interview with Marjorie
Arnold, Ken. Div. of Employment Standards (June 21, 2002).
164. 803 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 1:025 (1977).
165. Nebraska, an "equal work" state, also has a regulatory scheme that allows an equal pay
claimant to bring a claim through the administrative process. See NEB. ADMIN. CODE 139 § 003
(2002). This Article focuses on the broader "comparable work" standard among state laws and
therefore does not discuss the "equal work" state statutes in detail. Women in states that provide
an administrative process for bringing an equal pay claim, even under the stricter "equal work"
standard, would probably find the process easier and might fare better than they would in court.
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III. THE COMPARABLE WORTH DOCTRINE
There is perhaps no more controversial theory in the equal pay arena than that
of "comparable worth," which has been defined as
[a] theory holding that compensation for job classifications filled chiefly by women
should be the same as for those classifications filled chiefly by men if the jobs,
albeit dissimilar, are regarded as having equal value. According to this theory,
workers' salaries should be calculated on a scale of socioeconomic value that
transcends traditional supply and demand. 166
Comparable worth advocates propose throwing out the market system of setting
wages and replacing it with a system of objective job evaluation that would rank
all jobs or key positions in a workplace to allow a comparison among jobs in terms
of skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions. 167 "Employers would then
raise the wages of workers in all jobs or in female-dominated jobs deemed to be
underpaid on the basis of the evaluation (i.e., jobs having wages below other jobs
with the same total scores on the attributes included in the evaluation).- ' 168 It is
easy to see why the comparable worth approach to wage setting has been so con-
troversial. 169 Indeed, efforts to pass comparable worth legislation in the United
States Congress during the 1980s and 1990s failed. 170
Comparable worth has not fared well as a legal theory in the pay equity battle.
In American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees v. Washing-
ton,17 1 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that
[t]he State of Washington's initial reliance on a free market system in which em-
ployees in male-dominated jobs are compensated at a higher rate than employees
in dissimilar female-dominated jobs is not in and of itself a violation of Title VII,
notwithstanding that the Willis study deemed the positions of comparable worth.
Absent a showing of discriminatory motive, which has not been made here, the
law does not permit the federal courts to interfere in the market-based system for
the compensation of Washington's employees. 172
In American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 17 3 the plaintiffs brought suit against the
state alleging that it paid workers in predominantly male jobs higher than workers
in predominantly female jobs without there being any justified difference in the
166. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 375 (4th ed. 2000).
167. Judge Posner has described comparable worth as "not a legal concept, but a shorthand
expression for the movement to raise the ratio of wages in traditionally women's jobs to wages
in traditionally men's jobs." Am. Nurses'Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1986).
The opinion provides a thorough historical and cognitive analysis of the comparable worth theory.
Id. at 719.
168. LEVINE, supra note 10, at 14.
169. As Levine comments:
the amount of controversy over comparable worth relates to its being about more than
wages. In the view of some individuals, comparable worth "challenges basic cultural
assumptions about the relative value of the activities of different groups in society."
It also "would redistribute not only economic resources, but also labor market power
to women workers."
Id. at 17 n.46 (quoting Ronnie J. Steinberg, A Want of Harmony: Perspectives on Wage Dis-
crimination and Comparable Worth, in COMPARABLE WORTH AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION: TECHNI-
CAL POSSIBILITIES AND POLITICAL REALITIES 24-25 (Helen Remick ed., 1984)).
170. LEVINE, supra note 10, at 15.
171. 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985).
172. Id. at 1408.
173. 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986).
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"relative worth" of the jobs. 174 The court vacated summary judgment against the
plaintiff class but was skeptical of its ability to prove that the State of Illinois was
liable under Title VII on the ground it had failed to implement the results of a
comparable worth study. 175
Several governmental entities have embraced comparable worth in the wage-
setting of public employees with mixed results. For example, while Minnesota's
comparable worth program for state employees has resulted in an increase to
women's pay of 12%, Iowa's comparable worth initiative resulted in only a 1.4%
increase in wages for female state workers. 17 6 In 1987, the Canadian province of
Ontario enacted the Pay Equity Act, requiring private employers to apply compa-
rable worth principles in establishing pay rates for male and female employees. 177
A recent study of the effect of the law revealed disappointing results. The majority
of smaller businesses (those with between ten and fifty employees) 178 were not
complying with the law. 179 Women who worked for the businesses that complied
with the law actually saw their incomes decrease slightly.180 From 1988 to 1998,
there was not a significant decline in the gender wage gap, leading to the conclu-
sion that the Pay Equity Act of 1987 had failed in its mission. 18 1
It is beyond the scope of this Article to provide a full analysis of the compa-
rable worth doctrine. What is important, however, is to understand that "compa-
rable worth" is not the same concept as "comparable work." As set forth above,
comparable worth embraces a radical departure from the market-based system of
setting wages in order to create wage parity in male and female dominated occupa-
tions. This goes beyond the concept of "comparable work," which is the legal
standard set forth in several state statutes, including Maine's, for a woman to assert
that she is entitled to equal pay.
Putting the concepts on a spectrum, it could be said that the "equal work"
standard set forth in the federal EPA and the majority of state statutes is on the
conservative side of the spectrum of laws that provide a woman with the right to
equal pay. A plaintiff must prove that her job is essentially identical to the job of a
male comparator in order to succeed in her claim; any deviation between the jobs
will likely mean that her claim will fail.
On the opposite side of the spectrum lies "comparable worth," which is not
concerned with whether men's jobs and women's jobs are substantively similar.
Rather, the theory proposes that society place a value on every job, and jobs that
are considered equally valuable should be paid the same. A secretary, for example,
could be paid the same wage as a truck driver if there has been an objective deter-
mination that the skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions for these two
174. Id. at 718.
175. Id. at 730.
176. LEVINE, supra note 10, at 22.
177. MICHAEL BAKER & NICOLE M. FORTIN, DOES COMPARABLE WORTH WORK IN A DECENTRAL-
IZED LABOR MARKET? 4 (National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 7937, Oct.
2000).
178. The law does not apply to businesses with fewer than ten employees. Id. at 4.
179. Id. at 8-9. Among the reasons for the noncompliance were confusion about the law,
administrative costs of establishing a pay-equity plan, and lack of male comparators in an orga-
nization. Id.
180. Id. at 21.
181. Id. at 11. Proponents of comparable worth had predicted that the Ontario law would
cause women's wages to rise, leading to a decrease in the pay gap between men and women. Id.
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very disparate jobs are similar and are considered to have equal value to their
employer and to society as a whole.
The "comparable work" standard lies in the middle of this spectrum. A woman
who claims that she is not being paid equal wages for work that is comparable to a
male coworker is not required to meet the high standard of "equal work." Nor can
she rely on a theory that her employer should value the "worth" of her work as
highly as a male coworker who is performing a very different job than she is.
Rather, she must prove that the work she does is comparable to the male compara-
tor. Differences in the jobs will not necessarily be fatal to her claim.
Exactly how to meet the comparable work standard remains largely unan-
swered. With the exception of the Massachusetts court1 82 that discussed compa-
rable work, there is very little guidance as to how to support a claim for equal pay
for comparable work. Maine's rules governing its equal pay law provide employ-
ers and employees with some guidelines on how a claim for equal pay would be
analyzed and resolved.
IV. MAINE'S EQUAL PAY RULES
As described above in Part II.A, the impetus for adopting rules to enforce
Maine's equal pay law was a 1996 study of poverty among working families in
Maine. 183 It did not escape the Commission To Study Poverty Among Working
Parents that Maine has had a statute on its books since 1949 that ensures equal pay
and which has gone largely unenforced. 184
The rules that were adopted in 2001 by the Bureau of Labor Standards estab-
lished two major initiatives designed to enhance enforcement of the equal pay law.
First, the rules set forth an administrative complaint process for a woman to press
a claim for equal pay through the Bureau of Labor Standards. Second, the rules
established a self-audit process for employers to determine if they are in compli-
ance with the statute, and if done correctly, to obtain a presumption of compliance.
These initiatives will be described in turn. In addition, the rules provide a defini-
tion section that establishes the meaning of terms that are important in the equal
pay arena, such as "effort," "job classification," responsibility," "seniority sys-
tem," and "wages," among other things. 185
A. Bringing a Complaint
The rule provides that an "aggrieved party" who believes she has been dis-
criminated against in violation of Maine's equal pay law may file a written com-
182. See discussion of Jancey v. School Committee of Everett, 658 N.E.2d 162 (Mass. 1995),
supra notes 129-37 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
184. Commission To Study Poverty Among Working Parents, Report to the 117th Legislature
19 (Nov. 5, 1996). Strengthening enforcement of Maine's equal pay law was just one of the
recommendations made by the Commission, which was established to investigate "the extent to
which poverty exists among working families, how poverty among working or underemployed
parents contributes to the need for greater public assistance expenditure, and how economic
development efforts and other public and private sector initiatives could reduce poverty." Id. at
1.
185. CODE ME. R. § 12-170, ch. 12 (2001). The full text of the rules is appended to this
Article.
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plaint with the Bureau of Labor Standards. 186 The Bureau will then determine if
the facts, as alleged, state a claim for relief under the act. 187 If the Bureau deter-
mines there is no claim, it will issue a dismissal with information on how the
aggrieved party can pursue a private action; if the Bureau determines there are
sufficient facts on which to base a claim, it will conduct an investigation. 18 8 First,
however, the Bureau must give the employer written notice of the complaint. 189
An important caveat to this notice provision is that an aggrieved party who
wishes to prevent her employer from learning who has made the complaint can
obtain confidentiality. The rule provides:
Where an aggrieved party requests confidentiality, the Bureau must make every
effort to prevent the identity of the aggrieved party from becoming known to the
employer except when doing so might compromise the Bureau's ability to con-
duct its investigation. In such cases, the Bureau will advise the aggrieved party
of its need to reveal his or her identity and, thereafter, allow that party an oppor-
tunity to withdraw the complaint before notification is given to the employer. 190
The Bureau will conduct its investigation to determine if "reasonable cause
exists to believe that discrimination has occurred." 191 The employer is given an
opportunity to respond to the complaint. 19 2 The Bureau's investigation "may in-
clude the examination of evidence probative of unlawful wage differentials such
as a showing of pay differentials between employees with comparable skill, effort,
and responsibility; and/or a showing that jobs within the employer's workforce are
segregated by gender." 193 The Bureau may hold hearings and has the right to
subpoena witnesses and records. 194
The Bureau's investigation will result in a finding of "reasonable cause" or
"no reasonable cause." 195 If there is a finding of "no reasonable cause," the Bu-
reau will dismiss the complaint, issuing a notice explaining the employee's right to
bring a civil action against the employer.196 In the event of a finding of reasonable
cause, the Bureau may determine whether it wants to obtain a "voluntary compli-
ance agreement" with the employer or refer it to the Attorney General's office to
commence a civil action against the employer. 197 The rule also provides the par-
ties with the right to settle the case, including class-wide relief.198
B. Employers' Self-Evaluation and Presumption of Compliance
Subsection V of the rules provides employers with the opportunity to examine
their businesses and determine if they are in compliance with Maine's equal pay
186. Id. § Ill(A).
187. Id. § III(B).
188. Id.
189. Id. § III(C).
190. Id.




195. Id. § III(F)(1), (2).
196. Id. § III(F)(2). The Bureau must issue a similar notice if it initially determines that the
complaint fails to state facts to support a claim for relief, resulting in dismissal of the complaint.
Id. § Ill(B).
197. Id. § III(F)(1)(a), (b).
198. Id. § Ill(G).
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law. The primary means of doing such an evaluation involves the establishment of
a "job evaluation plan as a means of determining the value of jobs within the estab-
lishment." 199 Such a plan must be free of gender bias, allow for comparison of all
jobs within the entity, and "[f]ully and accurately measure the skill, effort, and
responsibility of each job based on the actual work performance requirements of
the jobs evaluated."'200
Once the employer has established such a plan, it must apply it to all "or a
significant sample" of jobs within the organization, focusing on jobs that are pre-
dominantly held by one gender. 20 1 The rule goes on to require the employer to
create a "job classification structure where jobs of equal value" are placed or grouped
together.202 The employer must then determine the base pay differential between
jobs that are occupied by one gender to those that are occupied by the other gender
"in order to identify any wage rate discrimination. '203 If the employer finds dis-
crimination, it must remedy any base pay differential, without reducing the pay of
any employee or class of employees.20 4
Assuming an employer can meet the requirements of subsection V, the em-
ployer is entitled to a presumption of compliance with the equal pay law.20 5 The
rule goes on to provide that the presumption "may be strengthened" when it can be
shown that the employer's self-evaluation process was done in communication
with all the employees within the establishment. 206
C. Where Does Maine Go from Here?
Maine's rules are an excellent first step in establishing an administrative pro-
cess that might actually encourage employees to bring claims and employers vol-
untarily to come into compliance with the equal pay statute. The administrative
process provides the Bureau of Labor Standards with the key roles of investigating
and resolving claims. The employee who brings a complaint is assured of as much
confidentiality as can be afforded in the process. The rules provide an opportunity
for negotiated resolution but retain the process for testimonial hearing and formal
resolution with the right to appeal. 207 In short, the rules have created a process
that will allow employees to bring claims and employers to defend claims in an
atmosphere that is less intimidating than court.
Moreover, the rules' emphasis on employer self-evaluation and the creation of
a presumption are innovative attempts to create incentives for employers to com-
ply with the equal pay law. The rules are lacking in specifics as to how employers
should create a job-evaluation plan that will measure the skill, effort, and respon-
199. Id. § V(A)(3).
200. Id. § V(A)(3)(a)-(c).
201. Id. § V(A)(4).
202. Id. § V(A)(5).
203. Id. § V(A)(6).
204. Id. § V(A)(7).
205. Id. § V(A).
206. Id. § V(B).
207. A party affected by the Bureau's decision has fifteen working days to appeal to the
Commissioner of the Maine Department of Labor or the affected party can wait fifteen days,
after which time the Bureau's decision becomes final agency action. Id. § III(H). A final agency
action, whether of the Bureau's decision or the Commissioner's decision on appeal, can be ap-
pealed to court pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act. 5 M.R.S.A. § 11001(l) (2002).
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sibility of each job within an organization. Although employers may find this lack
of specific guidance frustrating, it is probably wise for the Bureau not to attempt to
establish rigid job-evaluation approaches. In a state such as Maine with many
small business owners, one size would not fit all. Maine employers should have
flexibility in determining how to establish a job-evaluation system. Many would
resort to the use of consultants, which could result in higher compliance rate. In
Ontario, for example, employers who used experts to assist in establishing a plan
to comply with the 1987 comparable worth law had a higher level of success in
bringing about pay equity.208
As good as the rules are in setting forth a system for dealing with pay-equity
claims, they will not be effective until employees and employers are aware of them
and are willing to use them. The Bureau of Labor Standards has featured the equal
pay law on its compliance posters for Maine employers. It must do more, how-
ever, to ensure that employees are aware of their right to bring a claim and also
aware that there is an administrative process that makes bringing a claim less oner-
ous than filing a lawsuit.
The Bureau should also do more to educate employers about the law and en-
courage them to engage in the self-evaluation process, emphasizing the presump-
tion that results from a properly conducted job evaluation. Perhaps it is unrealistic
to expect employers to engage in a self-evaluation process at present, as there have
been very few claims in the past, and there seems to be little threat that claims will
increase any time soon. If outreach efforts do not encourage employers to engage
in the job evaluation process, the Bureau could consider using a random audit
system to ensure compliance, much as it does in the child-labor context.20 9 There
is nothing in the law or the rules that would prevent the Bureau from taking an
active role in ensuring that employers understand their obligation to pay women
equally for work that is comparable to their male colleagues.
V. CONCLUSION
It seems clear that the problem is not that there are not enough pay-equity
laws on the books in this country. Rather, the problem is that the federal and state
laws requiring a woman to show that her work is equal to that of a male colleague
and providing a catch-all exception for not paying equal wages do little to help
women obtain pay equity. The laws in states such as Maine that provide the easier"comparable work" statute also have not encouraged large numbers of women to
bring claims for equal pay, nor have the courts upheld those rights with enthusi-
asm.
In addition to the lack of support from the courts, one reason that women do
not bring pay equity claims under the state laws is their lack of awareness of these
laws. It could be surmised that women who live in a "comparable work" state are
aware of the federal law's requirement of "equal pay for equal work" but do not
know that their state's standard is broader. There appears to be little outreach by
208. BAKER & FORTIN, supra note 177, at 8.
209. Employers' records are subject to inspection by representatives of the Division of Labor
Standards. 26 M.R.S.A. § 622 (Supp. 2001). See Devin Wilson, The Kids AreAlright, MAINEBIZ,
June 24, 2002 (describing the random computer selection and inspection conducted by the Bu-
reau of Labor Standards to inspect businesses for compliance with Maine's child labor laws).
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these states to encourage women to bring these claims. 2 10 Maine's law has gone
largely unnoticed since it was enacted in 1949. The 1996 Commission To Study
Poverty Among Working Families discovered the law, resulting in a brief resur-
gence of interest. Since the rules went into effect in November 2001, however, the
Bureau of Labor Standards has not seen an increase in claims.
Another reason for the lack of complaints is that it is a risky proposition for a
woman to register any kind of discrimination complaint against her employer. In
studying the Ontario comparable worth pay-equity law,2 11 which is applied to the
private sector, the authors noted:
There is a sense in which the entire structure of the Ontario legislation is moti-
vated by the failure of previous complaint-based pay equity laws to have any
bite. In these programs, employees must register a complaint to trigger a com-
parison of male and female jobs and any consequent awards. Fears that most
employees would be too intimidated to register a complaint led to criticism that
these sorts of policies were impotent.2 12
In short, even if it were easier to bring a claim or prove a case of wage dis-
crimination, few women will register a complaint if they perceive that doing so
will risk their jobs and possibly taint their careers. In Maine, the process has be-
come easier for women, with the rules setting forth a user-friendly administrative
process as well as the assurance of anonymity. Nevertheless, it still requires that a
woman take affirmative action against her employer, which is not an easy thing to
do.
Although the laws must provide remedies for women who are brave enough to
bring a claim, in enforcing these statutes the states must not be wholly reliant on a
complaint process to uncover noncompliance. The lack of incentives as well as
the lack of punitive measures have thus far created an environment in which em-
ployers are free to pay male employees more than female employees doing equal
or comparable work in the United States. Getting employers to play a role in
complying with the law, whether through voluntary efforts or through an investi-
gatory audit process, is key to furthering enforcement of pay-equity laws.
With rules that provide an easier process for women bringing complaints and
a more encouraging reason for employers to comply with the law, Maine has taken
positive steps to bring its equal pay statute to life. Perhaps other states, particu-
larly those with a comparable work standard in their statute, will follow Maine's
lead and enact rules that encourage compliance with their pay-equity statutes. Such
efforts could perhaps help shorten what has turned out to be a very long journey
toward pay equity for women in this country.
210. See supra notes 162-63.
211. See supra notes 177-81.
212. BAKER & FORTIN, supra note 177, at 6.
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APPENDIX
12-170 Chapter 12: Rules Relating to Equal Pay
I. Definitions.
As used in this chapter and in interpreting 26 MRSA § 628, unless the context
clearly requires otherwise, the following terms have the following meanings:
A. "Aggrieved party" means any individual, group, or organization, includ-
ing current or former employees, or a labor union, who has been injured, or whose
members have been injured, by a practice alleged to violate 26 MRSA § 628 and
these rules.
B. "Bureau" means the Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Standards.
C. "Director" means the Director of the Bureau of Labor Standards.
D. "Effort" means the physical or mental exertion required for the perfor-
mance of a job. Effort encompasses the total requirements of a job. Working con-
ditions must be considered in making a determination of the degree of effort nec-
essary to do a job to the extent reasonable and necessary.
E. "Employee" means every person who may be permitted, required, or di-
rected by any employer to engage in any employment in consideration of direct or
indirect gain or profit.
F "Employer" means an individual, partnership, association, corporation,
legal representative, political subdivision of the State, trustee, receiver, trustee in
bankruptcy, and any express company or common carrier by rail, motor, water, or
air doing business or operating within the State.
G. "Establishment" means an industrial or commercial facility or place of
business. An entity operated by the same employer shall be considered a single
establishment for purpose of this chapter even though it may operate at different
physical locations, where employees at these separate locations are engaged in
functionally similar operations and there is a substantial degree of central author-
ity for establishing personnel rules and approving wage rates.
H. "Job classification" means one or more positions sufficiently similar with
respect to duties and responsibilities so that the same descriptive title may be used
with clarity to designate each position allocated to the class; the same general
qualifications are needed for performance of the duties of the class; the same tests
of fitness may be used to recruit employees; and the same schedule of pay can be
applied with equity to all positions in the classification under the same or substan-
tially the same employment conditions.
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I. "Merit increase system" means an established, bona fide, uniform, and
objective system which rewards an employee with promotion, pay increases, or
other advantages on the basis of competence.
J. "Responsibility" means the degree of accountability and reliability re-
quired in the performance of a job, with emphasis on the importance of the job
obligation, including but not limited to, coordination of information, organization,
and the well being of individuals.
K. "Seniority system" means a system that gives preference to workers based
on years of service. For example, a worker with more years of service may be paid
more for performing a particular job than an employee with fewer years of service
in that same job.
L. "Skill" means the performance requirements of the job including, but not
limited to, such factors as experience, training, education, ability, human relations,
and communication. In reviewing the skill level of a position class, the efficiency
of any individual employee's performance in the job is not, in itself, a factor in
evaluating skill.
M. "Wages" means all payments made to or on behalf of an employee as
remuneration for employment. The term wages includes all forms of compensa-
tion irrespective of the time of payment, whether paid periodically or deferred
until a later date, and whether called wages, salary, or profit sharing. An expense
account, monthly minimum, bonus, uniform cleaning allowance, board or lodg-
ing, use of company car, gasoline allowance, vacation and holiday pay and pre-
mium pay for work on weekends, holidays or other days, or hours in excess or
outside of the employee's regular days or hours of work are also considered remu-
neration for employment under this chapter.
II. Equal Pay for Jobs with Comparable Requirements.
A. An employer shall not discriminate between employees within the same
establishment on the basis of gender by paying wages to any employee in any
occupation at a rate less than the rate paid to an employee of the opposite gender
for comparable work on jobs with comparable requirements related to skill, effort,
and responsibility.
B. Nothing in subsection A shall prohibit the payment of different wages to
employees where such payment is made pursuant to any of the following:
1. A seniority system;
2. A merit increase system; or
3. A difference in the shift or time of day worked.
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Nonetheless, the preceding systems or circumstances must not be found to
discriminate on the basis of gender.
III. Complaint Process
A. Any aggrieved party who believes that he or she has been discriminated
against in violation of 26 MRSA § 628 may file a complaint with the Bureau of
Labor Standards. The Bureau must provide the aggrieved party with a complaint
form on which the aggrieved party shall state in writing the facts upon which the
complaint is based and the harm suffered. The aggrieved party stating that the facts
presented are true to the best of her or his knowledge must sign this form. The
form should be sent to the Bureau's Wage and Hour Division. [Note: the address of
the Wage and Hour Division is 45 State House Station, Augusta, ME 04333- 0045.]
B. If the Bureau determines that the facts provided by the aggrieved party do
not state a claim upon which relief can be granted under this chapter, it may dis-
miss the complaint but must keep confidential the name of the aggrieved party and
employer involved. Written notice of any such dismissal must be given to the ag-
grieved party. The notice must also advise the aggrieved party of his or her right to
bring a civil action under 26 MRSA § 628, how such action may be brought, the
deadlines for filing such action, and any available attorney fees, should the ag-
grieved party prevail. The Bureau will not pursue an investigation following such
dismissal unless new evidence is presented which, on review, supports the merits
of the claim. The Bureau will not accept a new case nor reopen a previously re-
viewed case that is the subject of a civil action.
C. As soon as practicable, the Bureau must, except in those complaints dis-
missed under subsection B, provide written notice to the employer against whom
allegations have been made that a complaint has been filed, along with such infor-
mation as is reasonably sufficient for the employer to understand and respond to
the complaint. Where an aggrieved party requests confidentiality, the Bureau must
make every effort to prevent the identity of the aggrieved party from becoming
known to the employer except when doing so might compromise the Bureau's
ability to conduct its investigation. In such cases, the Bureau will advise the ag-
grieved party of its need to reveal his or her identity and, thereafter, allow that
party an opportunity to withdraw the complaint before notification is given to the
employer.
D. With respect to all complaints, except those dismissed under subsection
B, the Bureau must conduct an investigation and determine if reasonable cause
exists to believe that discrimination has occurred in violation of this chapter. The
investigation shall include a request that the employer respond to the complaint, a
review of the employer's self-evaluation, if any, including a determination of
whether the self-evaluation meets the requirements of this chapter, and any rel-
evant wage and personnel information. The investigation may include the exami-
nation of evidence probative of unlawful wage differentials such as a showing of
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pay differentials between employees with comparable skill, effort, and responsi-
bility; and/or a showing that jobs within the employer's workforce are segregated
by gender. As part of the investigation, the Bureau may hold fact-finding hearings
as it deems necessary. Such hearings will be limited in scope to those issues that
the Bureau believes to be in question. The Bureau has the right to subpoena the
records of the employer and to interview witnesses under oath in the same manner
as provided for under the Maine Administrative Procedure Act (5 MRSA § 8001 et
seq.). The hearings may include an opportunity for both sides to present evidence
and witnesses. If a party presents witnesses, a cross-examination will be allowed.
Any follow up examination, if allowed, will be solely at the discretion of the hear-
ing officer.
E. In the course of any investigation pursuant to this chapter, the Bureau will
consider as confidential any and all information received, and may not divulge
such information except as allowed in 26 MRSA § 3. Unless the parties agree
otherwise, any negotiated settlement will be confidential.
F. At the conclusion of its investigation, the Bureau must make one of the
following findings:
1. Reasonable Cause found. If the Bureau determines that there is rea-
sonable cause to believe that discrimination has occurred under this chap-
ter it may:
a. Seek a voluntary compliance agreement signed by the employer
that eliminates the unlawful practice and provides appropriate relief
to the aggrieved party; or
b. Refer the complaint to the Attorney General, informing the Attor-
ney General of the relevant facts and recommending the commence-
ment of a civil enforcement action.
2. No Reasonable Cause found. If the Bureau determines that there is no
reasonable cause to believe that discrimination has occurred under this
chapter the complaint will be dismissed.
Whenever a determination is made under this subsection, a written notice
must be provided to the parties stating the action taken, the findings of
fact, and the conclusions of law supporting that action. The notice must
also advise the aggrieved party of his or her right to bring a civil action
under 26 MRSA § 628, how such action may be brought, the deadlines
for filing such action, and any available attorney fees should the aggrieved
party prevail.
G. Prior to the issuance of a reasonable cause determination made under
subsection F, the parties may settle the complaint on mutually agreeable terms.
Such an agreement will not affect the processing of a complaint made by any other
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aggrieved party, the allegations of which are like or related to the individual alle-
gations settled.
Nothing in this subsection prevents the parties and the Bureau from agreeing
to class-wide relief, provided that the Bureau determines that:
1. The aggrieved party is an adequate representative of the class; and
2. The proposed settlement fairly compensates the class as a whole and
remedies the discrimination.
All members of the class must be notified in advance of, and be given an
opportunity to comment on, the proposed settlement. Any member may
withdraw from the class and continue to pursue relief in a private action.
H. Any person affected by a determination of the Director may appeal that
determination to the Commissioner of Labor by filing a written notice with the
Commissioner stating the specific grounds of that person's objection within 15
working days from the issuance of the determination. After the 15 working days
the determination is a final agency action.
IV. Presumption of Compliance.
A. Where an employer, charged under this chapter with unlawful discrimina-
tion, has completed a self evaluation which meets the standards set forth in Section
V and can also make an affirmative showing that progress is being made towards
removing or preventing wage differentials based on gender, in accordance with
that evaluation, including implementing any required remediation plan, the Bu-
reau will then presume that the employer has not engaged in gender discrimination
in violation of this chapter.
B. In such cases, the Bureau must give the aggrieved party an opportunity to
rebut this presumption through evidence which reasonably demonstrates that, not-
withstanding the employer's self-evaluation, the employer has violated this chap-
ter. In meeting the burden of overcoming this presumption the aggrieved party
may provide all relevant information including, but not limited to, evidence that:
1. The employer's job analysis devalues attributes associated with jobs
occupied predominantly by members of one gender and/or over-values
attributes associated with jobs occupied predominantly by members of
the other gender;
2. Notwithstanding non-discriminatory basic pay rates, periodic raises,
bonuses, incentive payments, or other forms of remuneration differ be-
tween jobs occupied predominantly by members of one gender; or
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3. The job the aggrieved party occupies was not adequately evaluated.
4. A job evaluation process has been completed and, if necessary, a
remediation process is in progress or has been completed, but the self-
evaluation has not been reviewed and updated at reasonable intervals to
adjust for changes in the work environment over time.
C. An employer wishing to avail themselves of this presumption must pro-
duce documentation describing the self-evaluation process in the detail necessary
to show that they have met the standards under Section V, subsection A.
V. Employer Self-Evaluation.
A. In order to be eligible for the presumption of compliance in accordance
with Section IV, the self-evaluation must:
1. Clearly define the establishment in accordance with Section I, subsec-
tion G;
2. Analyze the employee population to identify possible areas of pay
discrimination;
3. Establish a job evaluation plan as a means of determining the value of
jobs within the establishment. The plan must:
a. Be free of any gender bias;
b. Allow for the comparison of all jobs; and
c. Fully and accurately measure the skill, effort, and responsibility
of each job based on the actual work performance requirements of
the jobs evaluated;
4. Apply the job evaluation plan to all or a significant sample of jobs,
focusing on those that are predominately occupied by one gender;
5. Create a job classification structure where jobs of equal value are
placed in the same level or grouping;
6. Determine the base pay differential between jobs that are predomi-
nately occupied by one gender to those predominately occupied by the
other gender, in order to identify any wage rate discrimination; and
7. Remedy any base pay differential identified in subsection 6. In order
to meet this standard, such remediation may not reduce the pay of any
employee or class of employees.
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B. The presumption of compliance may be strengthened where, throughout
the self-evaluation, including any needed remediation, the employer maintains
communication with and keeps employees apprised of the established process.
The method and procedure for that communication may vary according to the size
and organizational structure of the establishment. However, any method or proce-
dure chosen should be adequate to reach all employees at the establishment.
